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Joint Authorship and Dramatic Works: A Critical History
Mary LaFrance*
INTRODUCTION
Dramatic works have played a central role in the evolution of joint authorship
doctrine in copyright law. Ironically, a genre that began as a highly collaborative
enterprise has since become the focal point for increasingly narrow interpretations of
joint authorship. Indeed, the origins of today's problematic joint authorship standard
can best be understood through the lens of dramatic writing, as most of the leading
cases on collaborative authorship have involved disputes over the authorship of
plays.
The Anglo-American theater tradition is rooted in sixteenth-century England. The
explosive growth of professional theater in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries took place at a time when collaboration was ubiquitous, even among some
of the most famous playwrights. As the industry changed, however, a cultural
preference for romantic authorship took hold. In the centuries that followed, disputes
involving dramatic works had a major impact on the development of concepts
relating to collaborative authorship. Dramatic works continued to play an outsized
role in the leading cases on joint authorship under the Copyright Act of 1976. By
this time, however, the collaborative origins of Anglo-American theater were largely
forgotten and a judicial bias in favor of romantic authorship led courts to disregard
the statutory language in favor of judicially-imposed tests designed to defeat the
claims of joint authors.
This Article examines the evolution of copyright law pertaining to collaborative
authorship and finds that much of the core legal doctrine in this area arose from

*

IGT

Professor of Intellectual Property Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of

like to
Nevada, Las Vegas. For their valuable input at the early stages of this project, the author would

thank the participants in the 2017 Law and Society Association Conference in Mexico City and the 2018
Yale Conference on Copyright and Collaboration in the Theater, a joint project of Yale Law School, Yale
School of Drama, and the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library. In particular, the author would
like to thank the organizers of those events: Brent Salter, Fellow, Stanford Center for Law and History;
School
Professor Derek Miller, Harvard University; and Professor Steven Wilf, University of Connecticut

of Law. The author would also like to thank Assistant Professor Youngwoo Ban, of the Wiener-Rogers
Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law, for his assistance in locating research materials.

LaFrance. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction,
provided the original author and source are credited.

© 2022

411

412

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[45:4

disputes involving dramatic works. This fresh look at theatrical collaborations
reveals a rich history that calls into question the modem judicial presumption that
dramatic writing is the product of individual genius. Examining the history of AngloAmerican law's response to collaboration in dramatic works offers valuable insight
into the development of multiple concepts related to authorship-in particular, the
rules governing derivative works, works made for hire, and joint works. It also
demonstrates that the jurisprudence of collaborative playwriting has led courts to
develop an unduly narrow judicial interpretation of joint authorship.
Part I examines the ubiquity of collaborative writing in the Elizabethan theater
and traces its decline during the English Civil Wars (1642-51) and the Restoration,
accompanied by a contemporaneous shift in cultural preference toward sole
authorship that was fueled by the concept of the romantic author.
Part II
demonstrates the role that dramatic works played in the jurisprudence of authorship
in English and American courts during the nineteenth century. Part III addresses the
role of dramatic works in shaping the federal courts' attempts to resolve competing
authorship claims under the Copyright Act of 1909 in the absence of clear legislative
guidance for distinguishing among joint works, derivative works, and works made
for hire. Part IV examines the federal courts' restrictive interpretations of joint
authorship under the Copyright Act of 1976 in the specific context of dramatic works
and the courts' reluctance, in many cases, to extend those interpretations to other
categories of works. Part V suggests that the persistent influence of romantic
authorship has led federal courts to favor sole authorship over collaborations, and
draws a contrast with contemporary English courts' refusal to embrace this trend,
concluding that the American courts' preference for solitary authorship of dramatic
works conflicts not only with the federal statutes, but with the history of dramatic
writing as well.
I.

THE COLLABORATIVE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN DRAMA

Dramatic writing in the Anglo-American tradition is deeply rooted in
collaboration. As this discussion will reveal, however, the collaborative origins of
English drama have been largely obscured, for two reasons: First, the low status and
relative anonymity of the Elizabethan playwrights meant that these collaborations
were largely hidden from view. Second, the revisionist perspective of eighteenthcentury literary criticism, which venerated the "romantic" author and dismissed
collaborative writing as inherently inferior, created an expectation that literary works
of any value had to be the work of a solitary genius.
A.

THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE

From a contemporary perspective, it is easy to overlook the predominance of
collaborative authorship in the early days of English theater. As discussed below,
despite the explosive growth of theater during the English Renaissance, writing plays
was not considered a serious literary endeavor. Playwrights had no property rights
in their creative efforts, their plays were rarely published, and, in most cases,
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audiences neither knew nor cared who wrote them. History reveals, however, that
for even the most prolific playwrights of this period-including Shakespearecollaboration was the norm rather than the exception.
In the early Elizabethan period, most theatrical works were collaborations written
1
than text.
and performed by amateurs, with an emphasis on spectacle rather
However, Elizabeth's affinity for realism and dialogue-as well as her passion for
on the written word,
budget-cutting--drove English theater toward greater emphasis
2
By 1584, the first
leading to an increased need for "the poet or dramatist."
3
professional playwrights began to emerge.
Although the English Renaissance is credited with "the rise of the professional
5
4
The
playwright," surprisingly little is known of these playwrights' identities.
6
their
exceptions,
few
a
with
and,
dramatists owned no property rights in their plays,
7
names were rarely attached to their works. Except for a few freelancers and writermanagers, the professional playwrights of the Renaissance were simply employees
8
receiving compensation for writing and revising an
of the theater companies,
other new
agreed-upon number of plays, as well as adding prologues, epilogues, and
9
Once the
wage.
weekly
a
earning
material to existing plays, with some writers
which
company,
the
of
property
the
writer delivered the manuscript, the play became

1. GERALD EADES BENTLEY, PROFESSION OF DRAMATIST IN SHAKESPEARE'S TIME, 1590-1642,
UP TO
at 3-4, 198 (1984); CHARLES WILLIAM WALLACE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENGLISH DRAMA
SHAKESPEARE, WITH A HISTORY OF THE FIRST BLACKFRIARS THEATRE 122 (1968); JANETTE DILLON,
THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO EARLY ENGLISH THEATRE 127, 142-44 (2006).
2. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 122, 125 (1968); see also DILLON, supra note 1, at 127-28.
WALLACE, supra note 1, at 184; see also DILLON, supra note 1, at 110 (noting that playwrights
3.
first began to be perceived as "authors" in the 1590s).
PAULINA KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION: WRITING FOR THE STAGE IN ENGLAND,
4.
1660-1710, at 12 (1998).
5. DILLON, supra note 1, at 109.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 1, 15-16. At most, they owned their physical manuscripts until they
6.
conveyed them to a theater company or publisher. Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play
as Proprietor:
Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1390 (2010); see also Mark Rose, The Author
Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 55 (1988).
KEWES, supra note 4, at 1. For example, the extensive records of plays performed at Court
7.

between 1558 and 1585 identify the company and sometimes the company manager ("payee"), but they

make no mention of the writers, and in most instances they omit the name of the play itself. WALLACE,
century: The records of the
supra note 1, at 199-225. This practice continued well into the seventeenth
not its author.
Master of the Revels from 1623-1673 include each play's title and theater company but
OF
KEWES, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 (1998) (citing N.W. BAWCUT, THE CONTROL AND CENSORSHIP
(1996)).
1623-1673
REVELS
THE
OF
MASTER
HERBERT,
HENRY
SIR
OF
CAROLINE DRAMA: THE RECORDS

8.

BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 48-49, 62, 67, 88, 99, 101 (1984); see also Litman, supra note 6, at

these writers
1389-91. Freelancing became somewhat more common after the end of Elizabeth's reign;
Of the
17-18.
at
4,
note
supra
KEWES,
company.
the
to
work
their
received a flat fee upon delivering
1, at 264.
best-known Renaissance dramatists, only Ben Jonson was a freelancer. BENTLEY, supra note
1, at
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 134-43, 268; KEWES, supra note 4, at 17; DILLON, supra note
9.
112; David Scott Kastan, Shakespeare Didn't Write Alone, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2019),

https://perma.cc/X83E-8BRX.

Later in this period, it became customary for playwrights to receive, as

second or
additional compensation, the net profits from one night's "benefit" performance (typically the
third night). KEWES, supra note 4, at 15-16; BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 129-33; DILLON, supra note 1,

at 111-12.
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then had the exclusive right to perform the play and to decide whether to publish it.10
Many playwrights were bound to their companies by exclusive contracts" and
minimum output agreements,1 2 and were contractually prohibited from publishing
their plays.' 3 Even those not prohibited from publishing generally refrained from
doing so without the theater company's consent; because England did not enact an
exclusive public performance right for plays until 1833,14 publication would have
enabled a theater company to perform any other company's plays without
compensating the writers or the originating company, in competition with the very
theaters that employed the writers.1 5 Therefore, to prevent competition from their
rivals, most theater companies chose not to publish their plays.1 6 Control over the
play's performance and publication belonged to the theater company and the
publisher, respectively.17
On the rare occasions that plays were published, the playwrights' names were
typically omitted.1 8 One of Shakespeare's most famous and prolific contemporaries,
Christopher Marlowe, never had his name published on a single play during his
lifetime, even though his plays were widely produced.' 9 Even Shakespeare's name
did not appear on the earliest printed versions of his plays. 2 0
Despite the theater industry's growth during the Renaissance, both the profession
and its writers were viewed with moral disapprobation, often with strong religious
overtones.21 As a result, contemporaneous literary critics and archivists largely
ignored plays, contributing to the paucity of the record.22
10.
11.
12.
13.

KEWES, supra note 4, at 15-16, 20; DILLON, supra note 1, at 111.
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 114-20, 268.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 143-44, 266-70,273-75, 279-80, 282, 292. In a notable exception, freelance playwright

Ben Jonson published most of his plays soon after they were produced, never omitting his name from the
printed volumes. Id. at 290.

14.
15.

16.

Dramatic Literary Property Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will.IV., c. 15.
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 264-65; Litman, supra note 6, at 1390-91.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 3, 20-24. They may also have sought to ensure that the public had to

buy tickets in order to enjoy the plays. Id.; E.K. CHAMBERS, 3 THE ELIZABETHAN STAGE 183-84 (1923).
17.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 1 n.2; Litman, supra note 6, at 1390.
18.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 176; BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 275-76; Alex Knapp, Yes, Shakespeare
Really Did Write Shakespeare, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/HCW9-M5N6. Between 1580

and 1642, the title pages of plays published as quartos identified the theater company that owned the play

and authorized its publication, and sometimes the theater where the company performed (e.g.,
the Globe),
but "[t]he playwright's name was an optional extra, and was often not divulged."
BRIAN VICKERS,
SHAKESPEARE, CO-AUTHOR: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF FIVE COLLABORATIVE PLAYS 10 (2004). As a
result, collaborations are generally not reflected in the published plays. Id.

19.

Knapp, supra note 18.

20.

DILLON, supra note 1, at 109; Publishing Shakespeare, FOLGER SHAKESPEARE LIBRARY,
https://perma.cc/F9V7-WXJT (last visited Jan. 20, 2022).
21. BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 43-49, 57, 58-59, 88; DILLON, supra note 1, at 113-17, 189.
"Dramatists had low status because plays and players did." Id. at 113. Shakespeare notwithstanding, it
appears that most publicly-performed works in the Elizabethan era were undistinguished, and their

audiences undiscriminating. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 125, 178-79, 182-83.
22.
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 50-53. While some educated persons reportedly collected plays at
the time, DILLON, supra note 1, at 112 n. 11 (citing LUKAS ERNE, SHAKESPEARE AS LITERARY DRAMATIST

13 (2003)), in 1612 Sir Thomas Bodley pointedly excluded plays from his new library at Oxford,
dismissing them as "riff-raffs," of which "hardly one in forty" were "worthy the keeping." DILLON, supra
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The low status and relative anonymity of Elizabethan playwrights largely masks
the fact that collaboration, including the appropriation of earlier works, was "the
23
and
Renaissance English theatre's dominant mode of textual production,"
24
common
was
It
century.
mid-seventeenth
the
until
continued to be commonplace
2
25
for plays to have two to four authors -sometimes as many as five 6-and many
27
plays went through later revisions by different authors. According to one estimate,
roughly half of the plays written for commercial theater between 1590 and 1642
28
Collaborations involved such famous names as Ben
involved multiple writers.
29
Playwright Thomas Heywood
Jonson, Francis Beaumont, and Thomas Dekker.
30
finger" in 220 plays.
main
a
at
least
or
hand,
claimed to have had "an entire
Although the idea that Shakespeare himself had collaborators sparked outrage as
recently as 1986,31 that fact is widely accepted today; the lengthy list is said to
include John Fletcher, Ben Jonson, Thomas Kyd, George Peele, Christopher
Marlowe, George Wilkins, Thomas Nashe, Thomas Heywood, and Thomas

note

1,

at 112 (citing LETTERS OF SIR THOMAS BODLEY TO THOMAS JAMES 219 (G.W. Wheeler ed.,

1926)).
Jeffrey A. Masten, Beaumont and/or Fletcher: Collaboration and the Interpretation of
23.
Renaissance Drama, 59 ENG. LITERARY HIST., 337, 339 (1992); see also VICKERS, supra note 18;
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE AND OTHERS: COLLABORATIVE PLAYS (Eric Rasmussen & Jonathan Bate eds.,

2013); Mike Llewellyn, Collaboration, Paper Presented at the Shakespearean Authorship Trust
Conference (July 9, 2005), transcript available at https://perma.cc/XD25-RYPL.

24. Playwriting went on hiatus when the English Civil War shut down the London theaters in 1642.
KEWES, supranote 4, at 32, 130.
DILLON, supranote 1,at 110.
25.
26. KEWES, supra note 4, at 133; BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 126.
27. DILLON, supra note 1, at 110.
28.

KEwES, supra note 4, at 133; BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 199, 204-06, 227. The authorship of

these plays is not always reflected in the official records or on the title pages of the scripts. Id. at 199,
205, 209, 234. According to Pauina Kewes, collaborations comprised eighty-two percent of plays written

in early 1598, and sixty percent of those written in late 1598. KEWES, supra note 4, at 134 (citing NEIL
about
CARSON, A COMPANION TO HENSLOWE'S DIARY 57 (1988)). From 1600 to 1610, she estimates that
Philip
manager
in
theater
noted
plays
the
of
two-thirds
Almost
Id.
collaborations.
thirty percent were
Henslowe's records (covering the years 1592-1609) are collaborations. Kasten, supranote 9.

29.

BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 206-11, 234, 271.

30.

THOMAS HEYWOOD, Epistle to the Reader, in THE ENGLISH TRAVELLER (1633), quoted in

DILLON, supra note 1, at

111; accord, Chambers,

supra note 16, at 182; BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 126.

There is even some direct evidence of collaboration:

Of the few plays that were contemporaneously

published with authorial attribution, several included two writers' names on the title page. Llewellyn,
supra note 23.
Dalya Alberge, Christopher Marlowe Credited as One of Shakespeare's Co-Writers,
31.
GUARDIAN, Oct. 23, 2016 (noting that "some people were outraged" when the 1986 Oxford Shakespeare
first proposed that eight of Shakespeare's plays involved collaborators); Christopher Hooton, Christopher

Marlowe to Receive Co-Author Creditfor William Shakespeare Plays, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://perma.cc/333R-T555.
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Middleton. 32 The editors of The New Oxford Shakespeare concluded in 2016 that
seventeen of Shakespeare's plays were collaborations. 33
Collaborative playwriting in Elizabethan times did not necessarily involve what
we think of as a typical collaboration today-that is, several writers working in close
consultation with one another. Between 1566 and 1642, it was common for writers
to author separate acts of a play. 34 Even after a play's initial production, a new writer
might be brought in to revise it. 35 Some writers may also have specialized in certain
types of content, such as comic scenes or musical interludes. 36 Much like today's
screenplays, many plays in that period were commissioned works; the theater
company paid one writer to create an outline, then commissioned other writers to
write individual scenes or other discrete elements of the script, including music. 37 In
some cases, it is difficult to determine whether the multiple authors who worked on
a play were collaborators in the temporal sense, or whether a later author (often
anonymous) revised the work of the earlier author, since both practices were

common. 38

The extent of collaborative playwriting during the English Renaissance was
strongly linked to the demand for new works. This mirrors the collaboration that is
commonplace in film, television, and popular music today-three areas of the
entertainment industry where there is constant demand for new material.
Collaborative writing in the Elizabethan era was driven, at least in part, by the rapid
proliferation of theater companies and their continuing need for new scripts. 39 For
32.
VICKERS, supra note 18, at 6, 9; Daniel Pollack-Pelzner, The Radical Argument of the New
Oxford Shakespeare, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 2017. The title page of Two Noble Kinsman names
Shakespeare and John Fletcher as authors. Kastan, supra note 9. Fletcher is also believed to be the co-

author of Henry VIII. Id. Scholars believe that two of Shakespeare's early plays-Henry VI and Titus
Andronicus-were co-authored with more experienced playwrights, including Thomas Kyd, George
Peele, and Christopher Marlowe. Id. Thomas Middleton is believed to have contributed
to Macbeth,
Timon of Athens, Measure for Measure, and All's Well That Ends Well. Id. When The New Oxford
Shakespeare was published in 2016, three plays that had previously been credited to Shakespeare aloneHenry IV: Part One, Part Two, and Part Three were now credited as jointly authored by Shakespeare
and Christopher Marlowe. Pollack-Pelzner, supra (discussing THE NEW OXFORD SHAKESPEARE: THE
COMPLETE WORKS: MODERN CRITICAL EDITION (2016)).
33.
Pollack-Pelzner, supra note 32.
34.
VICKERS, supra note 18, at 27; BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 228-34; Kastan, supra note 9. One
company's records show that it initially paid one or two writers for their work on a play, then paid different
writers at later times for completing the play. BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 228. The title page of one
published play not only identified its two authors, but specified how many acts each of them wrote.
Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 5.
35.
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 235-45; Kastan, supra note 9.
36.
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 228. The latter approach would correspond most closely to the
creation of musical theater today, where the script, music, and/or lyrics frequently have separate creators.

Another copyrightable element of modern musical theater is the choreography, which is typically authored
by someone who does not participate at all in writing the book, music, or lyrics.
37. Travis M. Andrews, Big Debate About Shakespeare Finally Settled by Big Data: Marlowe
Gets His Due, WASH. POST: MORNING MIx (Oct. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/8VES-GUAA.
38.

BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 235, 240-63. For example, several printed plays identify the revisers

simply as members of the theater company that produced the play. Id. at 242.
39.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 133. There were at least 150 English companies during Elizabeth's
reign; in the first twenty years alone there were ninety companies, a significant increase over her
predecessor's reign. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 120. Between 1590 and 1642, there were fifteen to
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example, from roughly 1590 to 1610, there was a large demand for new plays,
occasioned by the relative dearth of good material in the early years of professional
work
theater. 40 The constant pressure to produce new material encouraged writers to
41
together in order to accelerate their output and reap the commercial rewards.
It is hardly surprising, then, that collaborations began to decline when there was
42
Between 1631 and 1642, only six percent of
a reduced demand for new plays.
43
The decline in demand was occasioned by the large
plays had multiple authors.
number of plays that were written in the previous decades and still available for
production.44 As a final blow, the closing of the theaters in 1642 due to the English
Civil Wars wiped out any remaining demand for new plays.
B.

THE RESTORATION THROUGH THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Ironically, it took a downturn in the theater industry as a whole for playwriting to
gain a modicum of respectability. In the late seventeenth century, the public finally
began to perceive playwrights as creative artists capable of true "authorship," and
the conceit of the romantic playwright-a solitary genius-began to emerge.45 This,
This
in turn, led to a new fastidiousness as to the authorship of dramatic works.
public's
the
by,
caused
been
have
may
and
with,
change in perception coincided
newly discovered interest in reading plays as opposed to watching them.
Even though the closing of the London theaters during the English Civil Wars
eliminated the demand for new plays, the publication and reading of plays became
46
Essentially, the consumption of theater
more common during the same period.
closed, the companies that had once
theaters
the
With
"underground."
went
had the resources or motivation to
longer
no
scripts
their
of
prohibited publication
47
the public, unable to attend plays,
time,
same
the
At
prohibitions.
those
enforce
both playwrights and printers to
for
opportunities
creating
them,
reading
to
turned
48
generate new revenues.

twenty companies operating in London alone. BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 65.
Elizabethan plays were written before 1626. Id. at 221.
BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 223.
40.

The most famous

Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 11.
See BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 15, 220-21.
43. KEWES, supra note 4, at 134. This period of decline roughly corresponds to the reign of
Charles I (1625-49).
44. The London companies commissioned fewer new plays during this period, and most plays
1, at 221-22.
performed at Court were revivals rather than new works. BENTLEY, supra note
45. KEWES, supra note 4, at 176.
46. Id. at 3.
41.

42.

BENTLEY, supra note 1, at 265. There had also been a notable increase in play publication
47.
during the earlier period of 1636-37, when theaters were shut down because of the plague, and continuing
for several years thereafter. Id.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 3, 100, 109. For a successful play, however, the writers' receipts from
48.
benefit night performances could be almost ten times the amount received from the publisher. Shirley
D.
Strum Kenny, The Publicationof Plays, in THE LONDON THEATRE WORLD 1660-1800, at 310 (Robert
Hume ed., 1980). During this time, playwrights also began to have more control over the production
they acted as
process, including casting, scenery, and rehearsals. KEWEs, supra note 4, at 19. Sometimes
earnings
their
maximizing
to
important
was
involvement
of
level
This
Id.
agents.
directors and marketing

418

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[45:4

When the English theaters finally reopened in 1660, their numbers and level of
activity were greatly reduced. The Crown authorized only two theater companies to
perform in London. 49 As a result, while there was a renewed interest in plays and the
public had an appetite for new material, the shortage of venues created a bottleneck,
meaning that fewer new works could actually be staged. 50 In addition, the law gave
each company exclusive rights in its scripts. 5 1 These combined circumstances had
three significant effects. First, because there was no danger that their plays would
be "poached" by the competition, the surviving companies were more willing than
their Elizabethan predecessors to permit playwrights to publish their scripts, and
indeed viewed publication as valuable publicity for their respective repertoires; 52
indeed, the publication of plays became much more common after 1660.53 Second,
because the demand for new plays was reduced, there was no longer the pressure to
produce new works rapidly that there had been during the Elizabethan era; thus, one
major motive for collaboration disappeared. 54 Third, because playwrights were no
longer firmly bound to particular companies, 55 they were much freer to cultivate their
own identities as authors and to pursue recognition, patronage, and economic
rewards by being publicly connected to their works.
During this time, playwrights derived many benefits from publication. Their
names began to appear on the title pages of their published scripts, 56 although they
were still noticeably absent from the playbills advertising a production. 57 With the
public's newfound interest in plays as literature, publication of a play with the
writer's name prominently attached enhanced the playwright's literary status, and
this allowed the playwright to attract wealthy patrons;58 a sole author did not have to
share the glory with a collaborator. As publication revenues increased in importance,
sole authorship also offered an economic advantage over collaboration. 59

from the benefit night performances; if a play was poorly received, it would close too soon for the writer
to receive the benefit. Id. By the end of the seventeenth century, the third-night benefit performance had
been extended to the sixth and ninth evenings. Id. at 19-20.
49.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 3, 12-13, 17-18, 134; Litman, supra note 6, at 1391. For one twelveyear period, only a single company was operating. J. LESLIE HOTSON, THE COMMONWEALTH AND
RESTORATION STAGE 277 (1928).
50.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 134.

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 3, 13.
Id. at 3, 23.
See Kenny, supra note 48, at 309-11.
54.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 134.
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id. at 3, 13. Publishers' catalogs also began to include the names of playwrights along with the
titles of their plays. Id. at 100.
57.
Indeed, on the occasion of a rare exception to this practice in 1699, John Dryden commented:
"[T]he printing an Authours name, in a Play bill, is a new manner of proceeding, at least in England." Id.
at 19 (quoting THE LETTERS OF JOHN DRYDEN WITH LETTERS ADDRESSED To HIM 113 (Charles E. Ward

ed.,

1942)).

58.

Kenny, supra note 48, at 312. Some writers earned additional sums by adding dedications that

flattered real or potential patrons. Id. at 311.
59.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 134. Nonetheless, once the writers sold their manuscripts to a printer
(for a lump sum), they no longer owned any interest in their plays. Id. at 30. Although the 1710 Statute

of Anne vested copyright ownership for a certain number of years in authors for works published on or
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Once plays began to be perceived as literature suitable for reading, critics began
to place a higher value on their originality, and the appropriation of earlier works that
60
was commonplace in the Renaissance theater began to be vilified as plagiarism.
By the early eighteenth century, playwrights were expected to acknowledge their
sources. 61 The proliferation of printed scripts contributed to the elevation of
originality by making it easier to compare later plays with the earlier works from
62
which they were derived.
Critical norms also turned against collaboration. Oxford scholar Paulina Kewes
writes, "By the end of the seventeenth century, . . . collaborative playwriting came to
63
From an
be almost universally condemned on both artistic and ethical grounds."
textual
and
integrity
the
jeopardize
"to
thought
was
artistic perspective, collaboration
as
viewed
were
collaborated
who
playwrights
unity of the play."64 Professional
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uncreative.
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appropriation,
"[L]ike
writes,
literary theft; Kewes
67
Kewes also contends that collaboration was frowned
ethos of singular authorship."
68
appropriation.
than
more
even
upon
As a result of these economic and cultural changes, the practice of collaboration
between professional playwrights that was so common in the sixteenth and early
69
seventeenth centuries came to be largely abandoned. Kewes describes the practice
70
of collaborative playwriting as "virtually defunct" by the late seventeenth century.
Out of more than 400 new plays written between 1660 and the 1710 enactment of
two as
England's first copyright law, the Statute of Anne, Kewes identifies only
to the
after its enactment date, in practice playwrights were still required to assign their copyrights

publisher in order to be published. Kenny, supra note 48, at 312.

KEWES, supra note 4, at 3-5, 32-34, 64. Even John Dryden was not unscathed. At one point
60.
he responded to charges of plagiarism with an argument that foreshadows the idea-expression dichotomy
of modem copyright law, asserting that while it was improper to appropriate a predecessor's language,

the borrowing of plots was inconsequential. Id. at 57. By the 1690s, others had adopted the same defense.
Id. at 79.
61. Id. at 95. Works appearing in print began to distinguish appropriated language with

THE MAKING OF THE
typographical markers such as italics. Id. at 93-94; see, e.g., MICHAEL DOBSON,
NATIONAL POET: SHAKESPEARE, ADAPTATION AND AUTHORSHIP, 1660-1769, at 99-100, 100 n.3 (1992)

Cibber notes
(quoting the preface to Colley Cibber's adaptation of RichardIII, published in 1700, wherein
that he has demarcated not only Shakespeare's words, but also his ideas, by using various typographical

devices).
62.

KEWES, supra note 4, at 109. One writer's commission to adapt an existing play into operatic

form led to a dispute when the same company that commissioned the work refused to pay him the third
night benefit, on the ground that his contributions were too minor. Id. at 106-07.

63. Id. at 131.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 142-43, 178.
66. Id. at 143-44.
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id. at 130. "By the 1680s, collaboration implied inadequacy and failure." Id. at 179.
69. Id. at 8. Although English literary critics also began showing serious interest in the concept of
intellectual property after the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, DOBSON, supra note 61, at 101, Paulina

Kewes argues that "the fairly abrupt change in common views of authorship between 1660 and 1710
resulted from a particular configuration of economic, political, social and cultural factors." KEWES, supra

note 4, at 11; see also id. at 130-31, 149.
70. KEWES, supra note 4, at 20.
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collaborations between professional playwrights. 7 1 From the late seventeenth
century onward, sole authorship of plays became the new normal. 72
Despite the prevailing trend toward sole authorship, one collaboration during this
period gave rise to what is apparently the first English lawsuit between joint authors.
In 1687, actress Elizabeth Leigh sued professional playwright Elkanah Settle for
failing to pay her the agreed-upon fee for her contribution to a play titled The
Ambitious Slave, or A GenerousRevenge. 73 The parties agreed that the actress, who
supplied the idea and wrote portions of the script, was entitled to the same share of
the proceeds as the playwright who wrote the lion's share of the script.74 The actress
may have cared more about compensation than credit; when the play was produced
and published, the professional playwright received sole credit. 75 This, it appears,
was the first English legal dispute involving joint authors.
By the end of the seventeenth century, playwrights had begun to scrupulously
credit any contributions made to their works by others, including specific actors in
the company, pointing out with particularity the components each had contributed. 76
This practice reflected the increasing pressure to attribute authorship precisely. 77
Authorship of dramatic works had begun to evolve into a claim of property
ownership, with respect to which appropriation and collaboration were inconvenient
complications. 78 For example, one of the two known professional collaborations
during this period was John Dryden and Nathaniel Lee's Oedipus (1678).79 Although
the play was successful and critically acclaimed, 80 it was criticized both as a
collaboration and as an adaptation of Sophocles; many of the detractors obsessed
over which writer was responsible for which portions of the script. 81 Some critics
cited the play as proof that collaborative drama was inherently inferior.82
As this history reveals, in the case of dramatic writing, the concept of romantic
authorship began to take hold in the mid-to-late seventeenth century, and was already

71.
Id. at 154-55. Dramatic collaborations during this period were generally limited to the leisuretime efforts of "genteel amateurs," either working together or with the assistance of professionals,

typically uncredited, who were likely to receive all of the profits (if any) and also stood to gain through
patronage. Id. at 134-39, 141.

72. Id. at 3. At the same time, however, the growing demand for reading material led to an increase
in collective authorship of other kinds of literary works, including translations, periodicals, and collections
of poetry, essays, and letters. Id. at 134.

73.

Id. at 140; HOTSON, supranote 49, at 274-76.

74.
KEWES, supranote 4, at 140-41; HOTSON, supra note 49, at 274-76.
75.
KEWES, supra note 4, at 141. It probably did little to advance his standing, however, as the
play was a flop. HOTSON, supra note 49, at 276.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

KEWES, supra note 4, at 141.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 143, 147.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 155-62. The other known professional collaboration was The Duke of Guise (1682), by

the same authors. Id. at 162. The play's controversial politics led many observers to attribute its
objectionable content to Dryden. Id. at 167.

82.

See id. at 160.
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could draw favorable attention and patronage. Respect for collaborative writing
declined, and authorial egos began to emerge. The results of this cultural and
economic shift eventually found their way into the jurisprudence of joint authorship,
where they persist today.

83.

Romantic authorship refers to the perception of the author as a solitary genius whose work is

entirely original. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual
Property and the Public Domain (Part I), 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 28 (1993). Kewes refers to
this as "proprietary authorship," KEWES, supra note 4, at 2, adding that, by the late seventeenth century,

sole authorship had become "an essential qualification of literary respectability," id. at 3.

See Rose, supra note 6, at 55-56 (citing RICHARD D. ALTICK, THE ENGLISH COMMON READER
84.
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions
(1957));
30-66)
The
of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 426 (1984); Oren Bracha,
192-94
Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values, 118 YALE L.J. 186,

(2008).
85.
86.
87.

Statute of Anne (Copyright Act 1709), 8 Ann. c. 21.
Millar v. Taylor [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201.
Donaldson v. Beckett [1774] 1 Eng. Rep. 837. See Rose, supra note 6, at 55-59; LYMAN RAY
PATrERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 147 (1968). In contrast to the extensive scholarly
attention devoted to Millar and Donaldson, copyright cases involving plays during this same period have

the
been largely overlooked. For example, the lesser-known case of Macklin v. Richardson involved
of the
unauthorized publication of a play which had been transcribed by a spectator without the consent

playwright or the company. Macklin v. Richardson [1770] 27 Eng. Rep. 451 [Amb. 694]. The court relied

on the common law to enjoin publication of the transcript, rejecting the defendant's argument that publicly
and that the unauthorized
performing a play gave the audience an implied license to use the play,
potential revenues from
playwright's
the
of
notice
particular
took
court
the
publication caused no harm;
authorized publication. Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Dramatic Literary Copyright Act 1833, in
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (Lionel Bentley & Martin Kretschmer eds., 2008) (citing
and
Macklin, Amb. at 696), https://perma.cc/D3D7-9NB7. Also, a series of cases in the late eighteenth

could
early nineteenth century addressed, but did not fully resolve, the question whether the playwright
Rep.
Eng.
101
[1793]
Wathen
v.
Coleman
(discussing
Id.
a
play.
of
performances
prevent unauthorized
also
137; Morris v. Kelly [1820] 37 Eng. Rep. 451; Murray v. Elliston [1822] 106 Eng. Rep. 1331); see
Litman, supra note 6, at 1399 n.109 (noting uncertainty regarding copyright protection for unpublished

plays during this period).
88. Rose, supra note 6, at 66-69.
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II. LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
In 1833, the Dramatic Copyright Act amended England's copyright law to
recognize, for the first time, an author's exclusive public performance right in
dramatic works. 89 Prior to this enactment, playwrights only had the right to prevent
unauthorized copying of their works; anyone was free to perform them. 90 It was
another two decades before the United States first recognized a public performance
right in dramatic works in 1856.91 The additional revenue derived from a
performance right no doubt increased the importance of identifying the play's
author(s) and rights holders.
In the mid-nineteenth century, dramatic collaborations began to play a significant
role in the development ofjoint authorship doctrine in Anglo-American law. Courts
of that period were still exploring the uncertain boundaries between joint authorship
and other forms of multiple authorship in the contexts of both books and plays. The
principles discussed by these courts include the antecedents of today's concepts of
derivative works, joint works, and works made for hire. Several of these cases had
a significant influence on judicial interpretations of the joint works doctrine under
U.S. copyright law more than a century later. Remarkably, every one of these
influential cases involved contributions to dramatic works.
Early cases wrestled with the problem of commissioned works, establishing a
concept that was a precursor of today's work-made-for-hire doctrine. 92 As discussed
below, a party who conceived the overall design of a work but commissioned others
to create the individual components was considered the sole author of the resulting
work, but this principle did not apply if the commissioning party supplied only the
general idea of the work, leaving the details to those he employed. These cases were
resolved on a "winner-take-all" basis. Only later in the century did courts begin to
explore joint authorship.
The 1856 case of Shepherd v. Conquest was decided roughly two decades after
England first enacted a public performance right for plays. 93 The plaintiffs,
proprietors of a theater, commissioned a playwright, Courtney, to create an English
adaptation of a French play. 94 There was no written contract, and no assignment or
registration of copyright-only a verbal understanding that the plaintiffs would have
the exclusive right to perform the play in London, and that Courtney would have the
exclusive right to perform it elsewhere in the country. 95 Pursuant to this agreement,
the plaintiffs produced the play at the Surrey Theatre in London. 96 Courtney later
assigned his interest to the defendant, another producer, who staged a production at

89.
90.
91.
92.

Dramatic Copyright Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15.
Edward S. Rogers, The Law of DramaticCopyright, 1 MICH. L. REv. 102, 106-08 (1902).
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 139.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "work made for hire"), 201(b) (addressing authorship of

works made for hire).

93.
94.
95.
96.

Shepherd v. Conquest [1856] 17 C.B. 427.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
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their consent, the defendant responded that
without
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performance right in London. Under the
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the plaintiffs did not own the
law today-the exclusive right to perform
copyright
U.S.
1833 Act-as is true under
98
a
a play could be assigned only in writing. Because the plaintiffs had not obtained
establish
could
they
if
only
prevail
could
they
Courtney,
from
written assignment
99
that they, and not Courtney, were the authors of the play.
The court gave lengthy consideration to arguments in favor of treating the plaintiff
producers as the authors of the play they had commissioned, including an analogy to
the law of inventions, which at that time was subject to a work-made-for-hire
principle. 100 In the end, however, the court rejected the producers' authorship claim,
refusing to apply the work-made-for-hire concept:

It is enough to say, in the present case, that no such effect can be produced where the
of
employer merely suggests the subject, and has no share in the design or execution
flows
it,
to
belongs
originality
of
character
any
as
far
as
which,
of
whole
the
work,
the
from the mind of the person employed. It appears to us an abuse of terms to say, that,
in such a case, the employer is the author of a work to which his mind has not
contributed an idea: and it is upon the author in the first instance that the right is
10 1
conferred by the statute which creates it.

The court expressly reserved the question of whether, on a stronger set of facts, a
copyright could become vested ab initio in someone other than the actual writer. 102
The reserved question was presented just three years later, but in a significantly
different context. The 1859 case of Hatton v. Kean, in the Court of Common Pleas,
involved the ownership of music that was composed to accompany the performance
103
The defendant producer had hired the plaintiff specifically
of a pre-existing play.
04
When the
to compose music for use in productions of three Shakespeare plays.1
the
music,
the
perform
to
right
composer later asserted that he owned the exclusive
the
was
composer,
the
not
and
producer,
the
that
court rejected his claim, holding
05
they
but
authorship,
joint
address
directly
not
do
author.1 The opinions in the case
do introduce the idea that an implied assignment may cause a creative contributor to
lose ownership of his or her copyrightable content-an idea that later played a
significant role in the modern judicial analysis of joint authorship claims.10
Chief Justice Erle wrote the most detailed opinion in the case:
[T]he defendant was the author and designer of an entire dramatic representation or
entertainment, with respect to part of which, a small accessory, viz. the music, he

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 442-43; see 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (requiring that transfer of copyright be in writing).
Shepherd, 17 C.B. at 443.
Id. at 433-34, 443.
Id. at 444-45.
Id.
Hatton v. Kean [185917 C.B. (N.S.) [268].
Id. at 268.
Id. at 280.
See infra Parts III and IV.
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employed the plaintiff, because the latter composed the music on the specific
understanding that the music should become part of such dramatic piece as designed
and adapted for representation by the defendant, and that the defendant should have the
sole liberty of representing and performing . .. the said musical composition with the
said dramatic piece, and as an accessory thereto, and as part thereof. 10 7

Therefore, the Chief Justice concluded, "the music so composed by the direction and
under the superintendence of the defendant, and as part of the general plan of the
spectacle, must, as between him and the plaintiff, become the property of the
defendant. ... "108
The other three judges concurred, 109 with Judge Crowder
emphasizing that the plaintiff composed the music "under an express engagement
with the defendant." 10
Several aspects of the court's reasoning invite scrutiny. First, Chief Justice Erle's
description of the producer as the "author and designer" of "an entire dramatic
representation"11 1 raises the question of what, exactly, the producer authored. He
certainly did not write Shakespeare's plays. Nothing in the opinion indicates that the
producer had revised the plays, or had employed a writer to do so. Other than the
music composed by the plaintiff, the Chief Justice did not identify any other
copyrightable creative elements that the producer had added. While the statement of
facts refers to Shakespeare's works as the "plays," 1 12 Chief Justice Erle refers to the
producer's work variously as a "dramatic piece," a "representation," a "spectacle,"
and "an entire dramatic representation or entertainment." 1 3 His opinion is expressly
based on the defendant's uncontested statement of facts, 1 4 which states that
the alleged musical composition was part of a dramatic piece, to wit, Shakespeare's
play of "Much Ado About Nothing," adapted to the stage by the defendant, with the aid
of scenery, dresses, the alleged composition, and other music and accompaniments, the
general design of which representation was formed by the defendant.11 5

This terminology suggests that the court differentiated between the underlying play
and the producer's particular production of it. Thus, even though the Chief Justice
refers to the producer as the "author or designer" of "an entire dramatic
representation or entertainment," 16 he did not analyze whether and to what extent
the combination of elements produced a new copyrightable work. For example,
elements such as "scenery" and "dresses" might be a part of the performance or
"spectacle" without necessarily becoming part of an underlying copyrightable work.
If the music was an "accessory" to an entertainment that was not itself a

107. Hatton, 7 C.B. (N.S.) at 280. The court accepted the defendant's statement of facts, id. at 268,
because the composer did not dispute them, id. at 279.
108. Id. at 280.
109. Id. at 280-81.
110. Id. at 281.
111. Id. at 271.
112. Id. at 268.
113. Id. at 280.
114. Id. at 279.
115. Id. at 269.
116. Id. at 271.
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copyrightable work, then it would not be possible for the music to actually merge
into a copyrightable work.
It is possible, however, that the plays were combined with the music more closely,7
modern law."
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presumably be based on making the creative decision to combine these elements.'19
Had this been the court's understanding, however, one would expect that the opinions
would have expressed the thought more clearly-for example, by describing the
resulting plays as new versions or adaptations of Shakespeare's scripts. The court's
120
to the entertainment suggests the
description of the music as a "mere accessory"
the play's action as it would be
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Justice
Chief
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play.
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of
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stated at one point that the music "became the property of the defendant [producer],"
elsewhere in the opinion he described the defendant's exclusive right to perform the
music in much narrower terms, amounting to a mere license (possibly exclusive) to
perform the music in conjunction with the play:
[T]he defendant should have the sole liberty of representing and performing, and
causing and permitting to be represented and performed, the said musical composition
122
with the said dramatic piece, and as an accessory thereto, and as part thereof.

Because of this ambiguity, Chief Justice Erle's opinion could be interpreted as
finding either an implied assignment (somewhat analogous to the modern work23
giving the producer the exclusive right to
made-for-hire doctrine for employees),1
which the
exploit the music in all contexts, or merely an implied license, under
plaintiff would be the author and owner of the music, and the producer would have
a limited right to exploit the music-perhaps only in connection with these particular

117. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of"derivative work"). To be copyrightable as a derivative work
expression.
under current federal law, however, the work would have to be fixed in a tangible medium of
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Thus, the live, unrecorded elements of a performance would not qualify.
See AMANDA EUBANKS WINKLER, MUSIC FOR MACBETH, at vii-viii (2004).
118.
119.

be
Apparently neither party in Hatton v. Kean suggested that the producer and composer might

joint authors of the combined work;
120. Hatton, 7 C.B. at 268.
121. Music and Drama, BUFFALO COM. ADVERTISER, Feb. 7, 1867, at 1.
122. Hatton, 7 C.B. at 280.

Under current law, an employer is considered the author of works created by employees within
123.
§ 101
the scope of their employment, even without an express agreement or a signed writing. 17 U.S.C.

(definition of "work made for hire").
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productions. 124 The nineteenth-century treatise writer Walter Arthur Copinger
appears to have adopted the implied assignment interpretation.1 25
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Hatton opinion is Chief Justice Erle's
explanation of the policy concern that influenced his judgment:
One cannot but perceive that, if the plaintiff were right in his contention, the labour and
skill and capital bestowed by the defendant upon the preparation of the entertainment
might all be thrown away, and the entire object of it frustrated, and the speculation
defeated, by any one contributor withdrawing his portion. 126

Chief Justice Erle did not expand on this right to withdraw, nor did he consider
whether his withdrawal concerns could be answered by anything less than an implied
assignment of copyright-for example, an implied license 27 or joint authorship.
Hatton in many ways anticipates the reasoning that some federal courts have
employed in rejecting joint authorship claims under the 1976 Act.1 28
Several contemporaneous treatise authors criticized the analysis in Hatton. Evan
James MacGillivray argued that the producer was not an author:
It seems a strange thing to say that the arranger of a play becomes the author of, inter
alia, the musical accompaniment of which, perhaps, he could not have composed a
single bar. Would, for instance, the author of a book be also the author of illustrations
which he had procured another to draw for him? 129

124.

For an example of a modern implied license, see Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d

555, 558-59, 558 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that creating footage at another's request and delivering it
with intent that recipient copy and distribute it gave rise to implied nonexclusive license).
125. WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 108 (4th ed. 1904). Note, however,
that Copinger's account of Hatton also reports an additional fact not referenced in
the other accounts,
asserting that there was "an agreement to the effect that the music should be the property of the employer,"
which would be further evidence of an implied assignment rather than a license, leaving the composer
with no ownership rights at all. Id.

126.

Hatton, 7 C.B.

at 280.

127.
Under today's federal copyright law, in the absence of a written agreement, Chief Justice Erie's
concerns over withdrawal could be addressed through finding an implied irrevocable
license or,
alternatively, joint authorship. Under current law, the question of whether, and under what
circumstances,
an implied copyright license can be irrevocable remains unsettled, but several courts have held that such
a license is irrevocable once consideration has been paid. See, e.g., LimeCoral Ltd. v. CareerBuilder,

LLC, 889 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2018) (payment of consideration made implied license irrevocable);
Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224 (11 th Cir. 2010) (similar); see also Dave Fagundes & Aaron
Perzanowski, Abandoning Copyright, 62 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487, 516-17, 517 n.174 (2020);

Christopher M. Newman, "What Exactly Are You Implying?": The Elusive Nature of the Implied
Copyright License, 32 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 539 (2014); Christopher M. Newman, A License
Is Not a "ContractNot to Sue ": DisentanglingPropertyand Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses,

98 IOWA L. REv. 1101, 1160 (2013). Although today even a license that purports to be irrevocable would
be terminable, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304, terminating a license for the creation of a derivative work would
not prevent continued exploitation of any derivative works that were created in accordance with the license

before the effective date of termination. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A).
128. See infra Part IV.
129. EVAN JAMES MACGILLIVRAY, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE DOMINIONS OF THE CROWN, AND IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (1902). MacGillivray's
book hypothetical was not merely hypothetical, since it was based on the post-Hatton case of Petty v.
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In MacGillivray's view, the court reached the correct result, but it "should have been
on the ground that the plaintiff was the employer or assignee of the defendant and
130
not that he was the author." Eaton Sylvester Drone also criticized the decision,
presentation was not the author of the music, and the
the
stating that the designer of
drama:
the
music did not merge with
Nor does music become a mere accessory or inseparable part of a drama merely because
it is specially composed for such a drama. It may have an independent existence and a
music to Macbeth,
value apart from the literary composition, as in the case of Locke's
1 31
and Mendelssohn's music to the Midsummer Night's Dream.

Drone's reference to Mendelssohn's music is useful in understanding his critique.
as
At age seventeen, Mendelssohn wrote his Overture to Midsummer Night's Dream
132 Sixteen years later,
a free-standing composition, which he performed in concert.
he incorporated it into a complete score that he created to accompany a performance
133
Therefore, the Overture was clearly created as a separate
of the play.
copyrightable work. The remainder of his score is a mix of incidental music,
performed before and after the various acts of the play, and music that is actually
134
Because of these latter passages, in modern
incorporated into the dramatic action.
copyright terms Mendelssohn could be considered the author of a musical adaptation
of Shakespeare's play-that is, a derivative work-or perhaps a joint author of the
adaptation if another person contributed lyrics or revised the play's text.
Despite its analytical flaws, Hatton v. Kean had an immediate impact on English
jurisprudence with respect to theater collaborations. In 1866, Hatton's reasoning was
135
Wallenstein, the
applied to superficially similar facts in Wallenstein v. Herbert.
musical director at London's St. James Theatre, had composed music to accompany
theater operator Matthews' production of a play based on the novel Lady Audley's

Taylor [1897] 1 Ch. 465. In that case, addressing the ownership of copyright in drawings that had been
prepared for inclusion in a book, Judge Kekewich observed:
I cannot see my way to saying that in such a case the man who is the author of the letterpress
becomes the author of the book, including the illustrations... . I cannot see why the contention
should not be reversed, and the author of the illustrations should not equally claim protection for
them, and through them for the letterpress of which he never wrote a word.

Id. at 475-76.
130. MACGILLIVRAY, supra note 129, at 63 n.5.

EATON SYLVESTER DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
131.
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 250 (1879). The reference to Matthew
Locke's music is probably inaccurate. The most famous music composed for Macbeth, that of Richard
Leveridge, was used in productions from the 1700s through the nineteenth century. Leveridge's score
was mistakenly attributed to Locke until the 1960s. Therefore, Leveridge's score is almost certainly the
music that MacGillivray was referring to. WINKLER, supra note 118, at ix.
Marin Alsop, Marin Alsop's Guide to Mendelssohn's "A Midsummer Night's Dream," NPR
132.

(May 24, 2014), https://perma.cc/5LBD-V7R5.
133. Id.
134. John Mangum, About This Piece: A Midsummer Night's Dream, L.A. PHILHARMONIC ASS'N,
https://perma.cc/TE28-JSE2 (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
135. Wallenstein v. Herbert [1866] 15 LT 364 (QB), aff'd, [1867] 16 LT 453 (QB).
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Secret.136 After the London production, Matthews left the St. James, but obtained
Wallenstein's permission to use the music in a touring production of the play.1 37 At
some point after the initial St. James production, Matthews acquired the copyright in
the play.1 38 After Wallenstein himself left the St. James, a subsequent operator of
the theater-the defendant Herbert-staged the play for a second time (with
Matthews' consent), using the same music but without securing Wallenstein's
consent.1 39 Wallenstein sued for infringement of the exclusive public performance
right in his music, but lost.' 4 0
In the absence of a written agreement, the trial judge, Chief Justice Cockburn,
characterized the issue as "a pure question of law." 14 1 Specifically, he framed the
question as whether Wallenstein had composed the music "as an ordinary musical
composer" or, alternatively, "by virtue of some duty arising from his employment at
the theatre."1 42 The former would correspond to today's concept of an independent
contractor, while the latter would correspond to an employee-created work made for
hire. 143 The defendant's lawyer argued at length that Hatton v. Kean was
controlling.144 Justice Cockburn ruled in the defendant's favor, citing the rule "as to
an employer having an exclusive right in the productions of the employed."1 45
Because there had been an employment contract between Matthews and Wallenstein,
Matthews had an unlimited right to use the music, and to license others to do so; just
as in Hatton, the music became inseparable from the drama.146 As Matthews'
licensee, therefore, Herbert had the right to use the arrangements in any licensed

production of the play. 147
The Queen's Bench unanimously upheld this decision, agreeing that Hatton v.
Kean controlled.1 48 However, the separate opinions of the three judges (again
including Chief Justice Cockburn) reflect two distinct rationales.
All three judges agreed that Wallenstein composed the music while serving as an
employee of Matthews, using a concept analogous to the work-made-for-hire
doctrine, even though there was no specific contract for the composition.1 49 Two of

136.

Id. at 364; see also DRONE, supra note 131, at 251. A dramatist named Walters had adapted

the play from Mary Elizabeth Braddon's 1862 novel. Wallenstein, 15 LT at 366.
137. Wallenstein, 15 LT at 364; DRONE, supranote 131, at 251.
138.
Wallenstein, 15 LT at 366; DRONE, supra note 131, at 251.
139. Wallenstein, 15 LT at 365; DRONE, supra note 131, at 251.
140.
Wallenstein, 15 LT at 364-65.
141. Id. at 366.
142. Id. at 365.

143.
An independent contractor is always considered the author of his or her own work in the
absence of a written work-made-for-hire agreement, while an employee's work created within the scope

of his employment is automatically considered a work made for hire authored by the employer. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (definition of "work made for hire").
144. Wallenstein, 15 LT at 365-66.
145. Id. at 366.
146. Id.
147.

Id.

148.
149.

Wallenstein v. Herbert [1867] 16 LT 453, 454 (QB).
Id. This is the equivalent of an implied assignment.
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150
the judges also held that the music became a part of the play itself, in which case,
presumably, Matthews would own its copyright by assignment from Walters, the
playwright. This meant that the defendant Herbert acquired the right to perform the
music in her production of the play when she obtained Matthews' consent as the
51
assignee of the play's copyright.'
Justice Mellor, in contrast, did not agree that the music was included in the play's
copyright and therefore owned by Matthews. Instead, he acknowledged "some
difficulty, perhaps, in whom the copyright exists, because Mr. Matthews was not the
1 2
Rather than describing
owner of the drama" at the time the music was composed.
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publicly
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to
him
enable
153
that
believed
Mellor
Justice
while
Thus,
production.
own
her
in
music
Wallenstein's employee status precluded his attempt to assert exclusive rights, the
Justice was unable to say who actually owned the copyright, and was apparently
unwilling to hold that the music's copyright merged with the copyright of the play.
His opinion implies that the music copyright was separate from that of the underlying
play, since it was composed merely to assist in "bringing out the drama" by giving
"additional effect"-that is, to enhance the staging of the play. This would put
Wallerstein's music in the same position as set or costume designs-potentially
copyrightable, but not "part and parcel" of the underlying script. Justice Mellor
thereby left the ownership of the music copyright in a strange kind of limbo-a freestanding work of authorship, with no identifiable copyright owner.
The Wallenstein decision was roundly criticized by Walter Arthur Copinger and
Eaton Sylvester Drone, the authors of England's leading copyright treatises. Both
argued that Wallenstein was the author of the music, and that the Hatton case was

distinguishable.

154

Chief Justice Cockburn held that "it became a part and parcel of the drama, and was not an
150.
to the drama and
independent composition." Id. Judge Shee held that "the music was merely accessory
Id.
it."
with
incorporated
was really
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
151.

152.
153.
154.

Wallenstein, 16 LT at 454.
Id.
Copinger found Hatton distinguishable because the composer in that case expressly assigned

his copyright, whereas no such agreement existed in Wallenstein. COPINGER, supra note 125, at 108. In
a more detailed critique, Drone argued that Wallenstein "misunderstood and misapplied" Hatton, calling
had
the facts of the cases "vitally different." DRONE, supra note 131, at 251. The producer in Hatton
their
of
terms
the
under
would,
that
music
creating
of
purpose
express
the
for
composer
the
hired
held in Hatton
agreement, become the property of the producer. Id. at 252. Chief Justice Erie expressly
that the producer was the author of the music he commissioned another to compose. See supra note 108
of his
and accompanying text. Wallenstein, in contrast, had composed music for Matthews in the course
would own the music.
general duties as musical director, without any specific understanding as to who
DRONE, supra note 131, at 252. His duties were to supply and conduct music for Matthews' productions;
it was left to Wallenstein's discretion to decide whether to compose new music or acquire an existing

to
composition, at his own expense. Id. at 253. Whereas Judge Shee placed the burden on Wallenstein

prove that he owned the music, Drone believed that the music should presumptively belong to its creator,
thus placing on Matthews the burden of proving otherwise. Id. In Wallenstein, Drone noted, "[i]t was not
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Meanwhile, in the United States, the Southern District of New York applied a
very different analysis to a dispute involving an actor-playwright who was
commissioned to write a play. In the 1862 case of Boucicault v. Fox,155 a New York
theater operator had commissioned the plaintiff to write a play to be performed at the
Winter Garden Theatre, and also to act in the play.1 56 After a week of performances,
however, the plaintiff quit his acting role, registered the play's copyright, and filed a
lawsuit to enjoin the production. While the suit was still pending, the theater operator
closed the show and, representing himself to be the owner of the play, purported to
grant the defendants the right to stage the play at another theater. When they did so,
the plaintiff sued them for copyright infringement. The defendants argued that the
plaintiff did not own the play's copyright because he had written the play as a work
made for hire. Although the court found that the plaintiff had agreed to write the
play, to allow the Winter Garden to stage it, and to provide his acting services, all in
exchange for half of the profits, the court held that this agreement did not confer
ownership of the "literary property" itself.157 At most, the court held, the theater
operator had acquired only the right to produce the play for an open-ended run at the
Winter Garden; absent an agreement to the contrary, ownership of the play remained
with its author:
A man's intellectual productions are peculiarly his own, and, although they may have
been brought forth by the author while in the general employment of another, yet he
will not be deemed to have parted with his right and transferred it to his employer,
unless a valid agreement to that effect is adduced.'1 8

The court contrasted the parties' arrangement in this case with the contracts typically
used in the publishing industry:
Publishers, when they employ authors in particular literary enterprises, of course settle,
in the terms of their contracts, the rights of each party and the ownership of the
copyright. This was not the case of writing a book for publication and general
circulation. 159

The federal court's refusal to apply a broad interpretation of the work-made-forhire concept-in contrast to the earlier English precedents-is especially striking in
this case, where the playwright was hired for the express purpose of writing the play
seriously claimed that Matthews was the author of the music." Id. at 252. Matthews merely had the right
to use the music that Wallenstein created or procured for his productions at the St. James; he was neither
the author nor the owner. Drone also dismissed the idea that Wallenstein's music became a part of the
play itself: "[T]he judgment of the court cannot be defended on the ground that the music became an
inseparable part of the play, and could have no independent existence. Music and literature cannot be so

closely blended but that the former may exist and have a value independently of the latter." Id. Finally,

Drone compared Wallenstein unfavorably to the American case of Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1,691). DRONE, supranote 131, at 253-54, 257-58. For a discussion of Boucicault,
see infra notes 155-163 and accompanying text.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1,691).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.
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as well as performing in it. By all rights, this opinion should have amounted to a
definitive rejection of the "implied assignment" theory in American copyright law.
nineteenth-century
And yet, despite being cited with approval in a prominent
61
160
discussed in Part
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theory
writing, the implied assignment
disputes.
It is worth noting that the plaintiff in this case-the Irish playwright Dion
Boucicault-was an acclaimed and successful playwright and actor who was already
well known in both England and the United States at the time he accepted the
62
It is entirely possible that his renown in the
commission for the Winter Garden.1
district court in his favor; at the time, he
the
theater world may have influenced
genius.1 63 One can only, speculate
solitary
the
epitomized the "romantic author,"
whether the court would have reached the same conclusion if the plaintiff had been
a lesser-known writer or-worse yet-a mere actor undertaking his first writing
project.
As these cases demonstrate, up to this point in the nineteenth century, litigants
had not framed their disputes as questions of joint authorship. Instead, their
arguments focused on such concepts as works made for hire, insubstantial
contributions, implied licenses, and implied assignments-all concepts that
supported a "winner-take-all" resolution of the authorship dispute, rather than a
sharing of the rewards of collaboration.
The first case to squarely address joint authorship in England or America was yet
64
another case involving dramatic works. In the 1871 case of Levy v. Rutley,1 the
English Court of Common Pleas addressed a theatrical producer's claim to joint
65
This decision had a great influence on the development of
authorship of a play.1
in the United States; many decades later, Judge
jurisprudence
joint authorship

160.

DRONE, supranote 131, at 253-54, 257-58 (arguing that Boucicault's analysis was correct, and

criticizing the conflicting analysis in Wallenstein).
161.

In 1882, a different judge in the Southern District of New York erroneously cited Boucicault

as permitting implied assignments. See Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1882). Only one
court-a New York state court--has ever cited Boucicault for rejectingimplied assignments. See O'Neill

v. Gen. Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028, 1036 (App. Div. 1916).
162.

Of Boucicault's many successful plays, perhaps the best known is London Assurance, a comedy

that premiered in 1841 and is still popular today. The commissioned play at issue in this litigation was

The Octoroon (1859), a well-received melodrama which, 150 years later, enjoyed renewed fame when
Brandon Jacobs-Jenkins wrote a modern and critically acclaimed adaptation under the title An Octoroon

(2010).
Some twenty years after winning his suit over The Octoroon,however, Boucicault's reputation
163.
was tainted by accusations of plagiarism. See Litman, supra note 6, at 1404 n.118; Sarah Meer,
Adaptation, Originality and Law: Dion Boucicault and Charles Reade, 42 NINETEENTH CENTURY
THEATER & FILM 22 (2015).
Levy v. Rutley [1871] L.R. 6 C.P. 523. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned
164.
Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REv. 1683, 1693 (2014) (noting that Levy v. Rutley marked the first judicial

attempt to identify joint authorship).
165. The play was titled The King's Wager; or The Camp, the Cottage, and the Court.
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Learned Hand credited two of the judges in this case-Judges Keating and Montague
Smith-with formulating the very first definition of joint authorship. 166
In Levy, the head of a theater company-the plaintiff Levy-commissioned a
playwright named Wilks to write a play on a particular subject chosen by Levy. After
Wilks submitted his manuscript, and apparently with Wilks' consent, 167 Levy and
members of his company made various changes to the plot and dialogue, including
the addition of a new and allegedly "important" scene. 168 However, Wilks did not
assign his rights to Levy. 169 After Wilks' death, Levy sued another producerdefendant Rutley-for performing the play without permission. Levy asserted
copyright ownership as the surviving joint author. 170 Rutley challenged both

claims. 171
All three judges agreed that Levy was not a joint author, although they differed
slightly in their reasoning. Judge Byles considered three factors: (1) the small
amount of material that Levy contributed to the play; (2) the absence of a
preconcerted design; and (3) the lack of notice to potential infringers that they might
be sued by multiple authors:
The plaintiff was . .. a contributor of a very small part of the entire piece at a subsequent
time. If the piece had been originally written by the plaintiff and Wilks jointly, in
prosecution of a preconcerted joint design, the two might have been said to be coauthors of the whole play, notwithstanding that different portions were respectively the
sole productions of either. But the consequence of holding this action . . . to be
maintainable, would be that so many persons as may have contributed separate scenes
or portions of a dramatic piece might each have separate and concurrent actions for
penalties against a person who may have represented the whole or particular parts of it,
without any means on his part of knowing that there was a plurality of authors, or who
they were. 172

Judge Keating's opinion placed greater emphasis on the lack of a common design,
in language that has been repeatedly quoted by subsequent courts: "[T]hough it may
not be necessary that each should contribute the same amount of labour, there must
be a joint labouring in furtherance of a common design." 17 3 He explained:
If the plaintiff and the author had agreed together to rearrange the plot, and so to produce
a more attractive piece out of the original materials, possibly that might have made them
joint authors of the whole. So, if two persons undertake jointly to write a play, agreeing

166.
167.
168.
169.

Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944).
Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. at 527.
Id. at 524, 526, 528.
According to a written receipt signed by Wilks, Levy made a partial payment for the work, and

was to pay the balance after Wilks assigned "his share, title, and interest as co-author with him in the
drama." However, Wilks never executed the assignment, and Levy never paid the balance. All three

judges agreed that Levy was not an assignee. Id. at 527-31. According to Copinger's account, Levy had
asked Wilks to make changes to the play before it was staged, and Wilks did not comply. COPINGER,
supra note 125, at 110. However, the published opinion does not mention this incident.

170.
171.

172.
173.

Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. at 525.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 528 (Byles, J.)
Id. at 529 (Keating, J.).
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in the general outline and design, and sharing the labour of working it out, each would
be contributing to the whole production, and they might be said to be joint authors of
it. But, to constitute joint authorship, there must be a common design. Nothing of the
sort appears here. The plaintiff made additions to a complete piece, which did not in
themselves amount to a dramatic piece, but were intended merely to make the play more
attractive to an audience.174

Judge Montague Smith's opinion is the only one that directly refutes Levy's claim
to be the "author or proprietor" simply by virtue of employing Wilks to write the
75
play. For authority, he cites Shepherd v. Conquest.1 Although he was also the only
judge to acknowledge that "[t]here may be a difficulty in some cases in determining
76
who are joint authors,"1 his test for joint authorship was unequivocal:
[I]f two persons agree to write a piece, there being an original joint design, and the cooperation of the two in carrying out that joint design, there can be no difficulty in saying
77
that they are joint authors of the work, though one may do a larger share of the work.1

Here we see a clear statement that the relative amount of each person's contribution
does not matter. However, Montague Smith did leave open the possibility that a joint
authorship claim might be affected by the nature of each person's contribution:
The plot remains. The additions do not disturb the drama composed by Wilks: they
were made for the mere purpose of improving or touching up some of its parts. It would
be strange indeed, if not unjust, if the author's rights could thus be merged into a jointauthorship with another. There are probably very few instances-at least in modern
78
times-of a play being put upon the stage without some alteration by the manager.1

This suggests that he believed the plot to be the most important copyrightable
component of a play-or, at least, this particular play-and that other components
such as dialogue and comical or musical elements were of lesser value.
Montague Smith also believed that Levy could not be a joint author because his
alterations: (1) were unsolicited (even though Wilks consented to them); and (2)
were made after Wilks had completed his own work on the play:
[I]t never could be suggested that, when an author submits his manuscript to a friend,
and the friend makes alterations and improvements, the latter would thereby become a
to
joint author of the work. If, when the piece was brought to the plaintiff, he had said

174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 530 (Montague Smith, J.); see supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing

Shepherd). He also rejected the argument that Wilks conceded Levy's joint authorship in the receipt,

where Wilks referred to himself as "co-author with him in the drama." Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. at 525. Treating
the receipt as a binding admission of joint authorship could, in his view, lead to duplicative suits against

infringers: "If the rights of the author may be affected by such a document as this, the consequence might
be an inconvenient multiplication of rights and remedies, which never could have been contemplated."
arisen
Id. at 531. Whatever the legitimacy of the judge's concern about duplicative suits, it would have
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Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. at 530.
Id.
Id.
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Wilks, "This thing requires to be remodeled, and you and I will do it together," and
Wilks had assented, possibly a case of joint authorship might have been set up. 179

He did not explain why joint authorship "never could" arise from the first scenario.
It appears, however, that the missing element is the "common design": If the original
author and the friend did not plan their collaboration before the work began, joint
authorship did not arise. The mere adoption of the friend's unsolicited alterations
after receiving them did not, in his view, satisfy the requirement of common design.
In modern terms, Wilks essentially consented to Levy's creation of a derivative work.
Ironically, if this modern analysis were applied to the facts of Levy v. Rutley, a court
could find Levy to be the sole author of the revised play, and thus entitled to sue
Rutley for performing the revised play without a license-precisely the opposite of
the court's holding. 180 Instead, through another instance of implied assignment,
Levy lost whatever value might have attached to his contributions.
In contrast to the renown of Levy v. Rutley, courts and scholars have paid less
attention to Shelley v. Ross, another joint authorship dispute involving a dramatic
work decided in the same year. 181 According to the most detailed account of the
case, 182 while the plaintiff Shelley was employed at a magazine where the defendant
Ross was an editor, Shelley learned that the Royal Albert theater was seeking a
drama. Shelley showed Ross a script he had written, but Ross responded by giving
him the "plot" of a different play, titled Clam, which Ross considered more suitable
for the Royal Albert, and suggesting that Shelley "make such alterations in it as he
thought proper."1 83 After Shelley revised the script, the resulting play was
produced.1 84 Later, Shelley asserted joint authorship of the play, while Ross claimed

179.

Id. at 530-31.

180.

In most courts, the outcome would depend on whether Levy's alterations were more than trivial.

If so, Levy would be the sole author of a derivative work; if not, he would have no authorship claim at all.
See, e.g., Woods v. Boume Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding some musical arrangements
insufficiently original to be copyrightable as derivative works distinct from the underlying works); Alfred
Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) (derivative work must be more than
a "merely trivial" variation of the underlying work to be copyrightable). Assuming that the alterations
met this test, unauthorized performance of the revised play would infringe the rights of the author of the

revisions (Levy) as well as the author of the underlying work (Wilks). See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123
(9th Cir. 1980) (unauthorized distribution of film Pygmalion infringed rights in underlying play); 17
U.S.C. § 103(b) (copyright in derivative work extends only to the new material and does not affect
copyright in underlying work).
181. Shelley v. Ross (1870-71) L.R. 6 C.P. 531, was decided by the English Bail Court. Bail Court
June 7, TIMES (London), June 8, 1871, at 11. For other reports on the case, see Bail CourtJune
6 and 7,
LAW TIMES (London), June 10, 1871, at 104; MECHANICS' MAG. & J. SCI., ARTS & MANUFACTURES,
June 8, 1871, at 17; COPINGER, supra note 125, at 112 n.(a).
182. Bail Court-Saturday, MORNING POST (London), June 5, 1871, at 7. The actual opinion is
unpublished, and the contemporaneous reports are not entirely consistent in their facts, which may explain

its relative obscurity.
183. Id.
184. Although the Royal Albert agreed to purchase the play, due to a management shake-up it did
not follow through, and Clam was instead produced at the Surrey Theatre. Accounts differ as to whether

Shelley was credited as a co-author of the Surrey production. The Morning Post reported that it was
presented "as the joint production of Shelley and Ross." Id. Public Opinion reported that the Surrey

produced it "as the work of Mr. C.H. Ross." PUB. OP. (London), June 10, 1871, at 722.
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7, supra note
case was said to be one of the first English cases tried without a jury. Bail CourtJune 6 and

181, at 104.
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Bail Court June 7, supra note 181, at 11. The report in Public Opinion was similar:

His lordship . .. held that the work done by Mr. Shelley, though no doubt valuable, was such
technical knowledge of putting a piece on the stage as an author would be likely to require. The
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stage carpenter making and suggesting alterations for the more effectual production of the
might as well claim to be joint author as the plaintiff.

PUB. OP. (London), June 10, 1871, at 722.
188. Levy v. Rutley [1871] L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 531 n.l.
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improvements-if substantial-amounted to a derivative work? Or did Ross have
only the shell of a play, which he invited Shelley to complete as a joint author?
Shelley v. Ross simply provided no answer to the question of whether joint authorship
can arise when an author of an unfinished work invites, and adopts, substantial
contributions provided by another.
In these nineteenth-century opinions, we can see the early roots of many
considerations that influenced later jurisprudence on joint authorship: the existence
of shared intent to labor together on a common design; the nature, amount, and timing
of each person's contribution; the relevance of employment agreements and
commissions; implied versus express agreements; and the risk that multiple
authorship will create uncertainty for potential exploiters of the work. Under a
"winner-take-all" approach, courts tended to disparage small contributions as
insufficient to give rise to joint authorship, and creators of derivative works often
lost any ownership claims to the material they had contributed. Every one of these
cases involved dramatic works. And not one of them recognized a work as jointly
authored.
III. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1909
When American courts first began to address the meaning of joint authorship in
the early twentieth century, the leading cases involved the authorship of dramatic
works, musical works, and, in the most influential case of all, a dramatico-musical
work. Because the Copyright Act of 1909 did not expressly recognize joint
authorship, it fell to the courts to derive the doctrine from the common law.1 89 Their
efforts were further hampered by the 1909 Act's failure to address rights in derivative
works, as well as its failure to distinguish these from joint and collective works. Not
surprisingly, the courts turned to the nineteenth-century case law for guidance. Their
efforts were a partial success: While they developed a workable definition for joint
works, they struggled to distinguish among derivative works, collective works, and
works made for hire, leaving some creative contributors with no rights at all in the
works they helped to create.
The first reported joint authorship dispute in the federal courts, and the most
influential, was the 1915 case of Maurel v. Smith, which concerned a dramaticomusical work: the comic opera Sweethearts.1 90 The plaintiff Maurel undertook to

189.
The 1909 Act did not even mention joint works. It did reference "composite works," but failed
to define that term. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 1976). In contrast, the general concept of a work made for
hire that the nineteenth-century English courts applied in Hatton and Wallenstein-but rejected in
Shepherd-was codified in the 1909 Act, which stated that the term "author" included "an employer in

the case of works made for hire," but failed to define "employer." 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976). Using
a theory of implied assignment similar to that employed in Hatton and Wallenstein, see supra notes 103154 and accompanying text, American courts gradually expanded the concept of employment to include

all situations in which a copyrightable work was commissioned, regardless of whether there was a true
employment relationship. See Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325-27 (5th Cir. 1987);
Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint

Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 211-12 (2001).
190. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
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write the "scenario" for the opera, and agreed to collaborate with Henry Blossom,
191
When Blossom dropped out, Maurel
who would write the dialogue and lyrics.
192
Harry Smith later brought in
replacement.
his
as
Smith
Harry
accepted defendant
193
asked to decide which of
was
court
The
lyrics.
the
write
to
Robert
brother
his
authors.1 94
joint
brothers-were
Smith
the
and
parties-Maurel
three
District Judge Learned Hand relied primarily on Levy v. Rutley-in particular, the
language of Judges Keating and Montague Smith requiring a "joint" or "common"
design- in finding that Maurel and the Smith brothers performed their creative work
95
In addition, their respective contributions formed
in pursuit of a common design.1
and lyrics did not necessarily reflect the
music
the
though
even
work,
unitary
a
scenario, and could also be enjoyed on their own:
[N]o one can hope to measure the degree of contribution which the plaintiff made to
their production or selection, and no one ought to try. Moreover, it is not necessary to
hold that the "lyrics" have any relation whatever to the plot, or owe any suggestion to
it in the mind of their composer, because they became united with dialogue and plot
and music into one composition, and whatever their origin, in their presentation the
96
whole was single.1

Hand also relied on two of Levy's predecessor cases: Hatton v. Keen and
Wallenstein v. Herbert. With respect to Hatton, where the plaintiff had composed
music for a production of three plays by Shakespeare, Hand observed that "[t]he case
was much stronger for the separability of the part from the whole than the case at
bar, because the music was merely incidental to the plays, which were themselves,
97
Both of the older cases, Hand observed, "must be taken
of course, not musical."1
as declaring, even if it was not essential to the decision, that one who contributes to
such a joint production does not retain any several ownership in his contribution, but
198
that it merges into the whole."
Hand's finding of joint authorship in Maurel is all the more remarkable because
he relied on three precedents-Levy, Hatton, and Wallenstein-all of which had
rejected the authorship claims of creative contributors. In each of those cases, a court
found a merger of contributions, but held that the effect of the merger was to divest
one contributor of his authorship claim, through an unacknowledged application of

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 195, 197.
Id.
Id.
The composer, Victor Herbert, was not a party to the dispute. Id. at 202-03.

196.
197.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.

Id. at 198-99. He also relied on Shepherd v. Conquest to distinguish between a party that
195.
merely suggests the subject matter of a work and one that contributes the plot. Id.

Id. As joint authors, Hand ruled, the plaintiff and the Smith brothers were entitled to equal
198.
shares of the opera unless they had agreed to a different apportionment: "When several collaborators

knowingly engage in the production of a piece which is to be presented originally as a whole only, they

to apportion
adopt that common design, mentioned in Levy v. Rutley, and unless they undertake expressly

their contributions, they must share alike." Id. Because all parties had agreed to pay half the royalties to
the composer, Hand ruled that the plaintiff and the two defendants should split the remaining half three
ways. Id. at 203.
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the implied assignment theory. In contrast, Hand's analysis in Maurel found that the
merger of contributions supported a joint authorship claim.
The Second Circuit affirmed Hand's decision, finding that "there was a joint cooperation in carrying out the effort to complete the opera."1 99 Maurel and each of
the Smiths owned equal thirds of their jointly-owned share of the copyright, even if
their contributions were not equal: "It is not essential that the execution of the work
should be equally divided; as long as the general design and structure was agreed
upon, the parties may divide their parts and work separately." 200 The appellate court
also suggested-on authority of Copinger-that sufficient intent to collaborate could
exist even if the common design originated with a single author before any other
author had made a contribution, and even if that design was altered by a later
contributor:
The pith of joint authorship consists in co-operation, in a common design, and whether
this co-operation takes place subsequent to the formation of the design by the one, and
is varied in conformity with the suggestions and views of the other, it has equally the

effect of creating the joint authorship as if the original design had been their joint
20
conception.

1

In this case, Maurel created her scenario (the first part of it, at least) with the intent
of finding a composer and/or librettist to complete the opera. Even though the
librettists (and possibly the composer) made their contributions after she had formed
this intent-and even though the identity of the librettists changed from the original
plan-under the court's reasoning, all of the creative contributors to the work became
joint authors. This holding-that the co-authors need not work together from the
start, if the first contributor intended to find future collaborators-has never been
rejected. 202
Even though the Maurel court clearly recognized the existence and common-law
history of joint authorship, the 1909 Act's failure to mention joint works, or to
distinguish them from what we recognize today as collective or derivative works,
sowed confusion in other cases during this period. The 1909 Act clearly recognized
the concept of derivative works, even if it did not address the authorship of such
works. 203 The concept ofjoint works, in contrast, received no explicit recognition at
all. One statutory provision referenced "composite works or periodicals," but did
199. Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921).
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting COPINGER, supra note 125, at 109-10).
202. The rule was applied in later cases under the 1909 Act. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bemstein & Co. Inc.
v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. Inc., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946) (known as the Melancholy Baby case); Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. Inc., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944); see also infra notes
214-223 and accompanying text. It is also fully consistent with the language and legislative history of
the 1976 Act. See infra notes 228-231 and accompanying text; see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

203.

§ 6.03

(rev. ed. 2021) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].

While the 1909 Act did not use the term "derivative works," it did state that the copyright in

"compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations or other versions"

of existing works, and "works republished with new matter" did not affect the copyright in the underlying
works. Id. § 7 (repealed 1976) (numbered § 6 as originally enacted in Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. 60349, 35 Stat. 1075 (amending and consolidating the acts respecting copyright)).
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not define "composite works" or distinguish between the author of the composite
2
work and the authors of the individual components thereof. 04 The statutory
that
phrasing-lumping composite works together with periodicals-implies
"collective
as
to
referred
later
Act
1976
the
"composite works" were limited to what
works," 205 rather than encompassing other kinds of works with multiple authors,
206
These legislative gaps in the 1909 Act left courts largely to
such as joint works.
their own devices when faced with various types of collaborations.
Joint authorship was at the center of another case involving a dramatico-musical
work, decided in the same year as the district court decision in Maurel, but receiving
much less attention from later courts. In Herbertv. Fields, a producer hired a writer
207
Soon after that, he hired a composer
(Smith) to translate and adapt a German play.
208
Although the composer claimed to
comedy.
musical
a
into
and a lyricist to turn it
court found it "quite probable"
York
New
the
work,
entire
be a joint author of the
libretto may be regarded as
"the
because
songs,
the
of
author
joint
that he was only a
producer. 209 The court
the
by
owned
and
Smith
by
a separate creation" authored
distinguished Maurel, because the scenario in that case was intertwined with the
210
In contrast, Smith had
other elements of the work in an "indissoluble" way.
own, even though the
its
on
stand
could
that
play
a
adapted)
written (actually,
Accordingly, the court
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the
of
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the
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it
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1
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effect,
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musical
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Smith's
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be
could
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case,
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is
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if,
even
underlying play),
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"common
the
where
Maurel,
from
distinction
another
marks
This
text.
from the
writing
began
Maurel
time
the
at
existed
already
design" supporting joint authorship
204.

Section 3 of the 1909 Act stated that the copyright in "composite works or periodicals"

(repealed
205.
206.
Congress

1976).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "collective works").
This interpretation is supported by one of the studies on Copyright Law Revision prepared for
as it undertook the legislative overhaul leading to the 1976 Act:

conveyed the same rights as if each component of the work were individually copyrighted. 17 U.S.C. § 3

are not
[A] joint work is a unitary work, the parts of which, although created by several authors,

considered to be individual works in themselves.... A "composite work," broadly speaking, is

one which puts together the separate and distinct works of different authors.
PREPARED FOR THE
George D. Cary, Study No. 12: Joint Ownership of Copyrights, in STUDIES
JUDICIARY, 86TH
THE
ON
COMM.
S.
THE
OF
&
COPYRIGHTS
TRADEMARKS
PATENTS,
ON
SUBCOMM.

CONG. 87
207.
208.
209.
210.

(Comm. Print 1958).
Herbert v. Fields, 152 N.Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id.

In the alternative, the court ruled, even if the composer were a joint author of the musical
211.
owners
comedy, he could not, on his own, prevent another party from using the libretto if the other joint
consented. Id.

212. Under the 1976 Act, joint authors' contributions to a work may be either "inseparable" or
"interdependent" components. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "joint work").
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her scenario; thus, the finished opera was a unitary work. In Herbert, Smith had
already written the play before the producer decided to turn it into a musical; thus,
there was an underlying work (the play) with a single author as well as a derivative
work (the musical) with two authors.
Although these dramatic works cases were the first to construe joint authorship
under the 1909 Act, many of the subsequent joint works cases during this period dealt
with musical compositions. 213 As discussed below, courts continued to experience
difficulty distinguishing among composite or collective works, joint works, and what
today would be considered derivative works.
In the 1944 case of EdwardB. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., the
Second Circuit expressly held that joint authors need not work together at the same
time. 214 In that case, a writer created the lyrics for a song, and a publisher later
engaged a composer to set the lyrics to music. 21 5 Evidencing his belief that the
statutory phrase "composite works" did not include joint works, Judge Learned Hand
concluded that the resulting song was a joint work, and not a composite work,
because "it was the indivisible product of 'joint authors."' 216 As he had in Maurel,
Judge Hand applied Levy v. Rutley's definition of joint works as "a joint laboring in
furtherance of a common design" or "an agreement 'to write a piece, there being an
original joint design."' 217 He added, however, that joint authors could make their
contributions at different times, and without actively collaborating: "It makes no
difference whether the authors work in concert, or even whether they know each
other; it is enough that they mean their contributions to be complementary in the
sense that they are to be embodied in a single work to be performed as such."218

213.

There are a few exceptions, but these received little attention in subsequent case law.

For

example, in Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 46 (9th Cir. 1965), the Ninth Circuit held that a medical
book was jointly authored where the two parties jointly "conceived, compiled, and created" the book, even
though one of the parties had registered the copyright as a sole author. In Harrisv. Coca-Cola, 73 F.2d
370 (5th Cir. 1934), the publisher of an illustrated book commissioned additional illustrations for a new
edition without any input from the author of the text. The author's widow asserted an ownership interest
in the new illustrations, but the court rejected her claim. Id. at 372. Because only the new illustrations
were infringed, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the author's widow had any rights in the
originalillustrations, which had been created in consultation with the author. Id. The court also declined
to decide whether the book should "be considered a composite work consisting of the literary contribution

of Mr. Harris and the artistic efforts of others," defining a "composite work" as a work "composed of the
copyrightable work of several persons." Id. Thus, the court did not decide whether the text and the
original illustrations were separate works collected in a single volume, as opposed to a unitary work of
joint authorship. This case further illustrates the difficulties courts experienced in sorting through joint
authorship claims without clear guidance on distinguishing among joint, collective, and derivative works.

214. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
215. Specifically, the writer sold the song lyrics to the publisher, who hired a composer to set them
to music and then registered the resulting song as a musical composition. Later, the lyricist claimed the
renewal copyright in the entire song. As Judge Hand interpreted the statute, if the song was
a joint work,

then the lyricist could claim the entire renewal copyright (subject to a constructive trust in favor of the
composer), but if the song was a composite (that is, collective) work, the lyricist could renew only the

copyright in his lyrics. Id. at 267.
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Levy v. Rutley [1871] L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 529 (Keating, J.), 530 (Montague
Smith, J.)).
218. Id.
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Hand implicitly rejected Herbert'srequirement that the elements of a joint work be
2 19
even though the lyrics and the music of the song could be used
"indissoluble";
separately, "that was not their purpose; the words and the music were to be enjoyed
is
and performed together; unlike the parts of a 'composite work,' each of which
bound
are
they
that
is
unity
only
whose
and
separately,
used
intended to be
220
together."
Unfortunately, Judge Hand also used the term "joint work" to refer to what today
would be considered a derivative work, even as he pointedly distinguished between
authors who share a common design and those who do not:
[I]f the first part is composed without any common design, its author retains power to

forbid publication of the joint work. Whatever popularity the second author's
contribution may have added to the first's, which will survive their divorce, he must be
content to release to the first author; whatever popularity his own contribution has
an
gained from the association, he must be content to lose. Not so, when both plan
undivided whole; in that case unless they stipulate otherwise in advance, their separate
interests will be as inextricably involved, as are the threads out of which they have
221
woven the seamless fabric of the work.

The first two sentences clearly refer to an underlying work (the "first part") and a
derivative work (that of the "second author"), while the second sentence describes
the creation of a true joint work, "when both plan an undivided whole." However,
this passage also posits, in dictum, that the person who creates a derivative work
automatically surrenders his or her authorship rights to the creator of the underlying
"winnerwork, who thereby becomes the sole author of the derivative work. This
an
cases-involves
nineteenth-century
the
from
over
approach-carried
take-all"
that
rule
works
derivative
the
of
opposite
the
precisely
is
that
implied assignment
Congress later adopted in the 1976 Act, under which a person who makes alterations
to an underlying work with the consent of the underlying work's author becomes the
sole author of the derivative work, while the authorship of the underlying work
222
Despite Congress's clear rejection of the implied assignment
remains unchanged.

219.

220.

See supra notes 210-211 and accompanying text.

Edward B. Marks Music, 140 F.2d at 267. The rule announced by Judge Hand in Edward B.

later in the
Marks Music-that joint authors need not actively collaborate-was applied two years

Melancholy Baby case, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 161 F.2d 406 (2d
Cir. 1946), with Judge Hand on this panel as well. In Melancholy Baby, a composer and lyricist jointly
writer
authored a song and registered the copyright. When a potential purchaser wanted to hire another

in the
to replace the lyrics, the composer gave his consent. The purchaser then acquired the copyright
Judge
song as well as the replacement lyrics. In resolving a dispute arising from the copyright renewal,
because the
Swan held that the composer and the second lyricist were joint authors of the revised song,
on the identity of the lyricist.
composer's intent to combine his music with another's lyrics did not depend
from the
The revised song was both a "joint work" and a "new work" that was separately copyrightable

previous version of the song.

Id. at 410.

The court did not consider whether the original lyricist should

be also considered a joint author of the revised song. See Cary, supra note 206, at 92.

221. Edward B. Marks Music, 140 F.2d at 267.
222. Under the 1976 Act, the creator of a licensed derivative work is the author thereof, although
the copyright in the underlying work remains the property of the licensor. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
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approach when it revised the copyright laws in 1976, Judge Hand's theory later
resurfaced in the Second Circuit's interpretationofjoint works under the 1976 Act. 223
The Second Circuit used the implied assignment theory again in 1972, in Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, reviewing a district court's holding that: (1) the author of a
song did not collaborate with a later songwriter who revised the song with the consent
of the copyright owner; and (2) the latter's revisions were not substantial enough to
amount to joint authorship.224 The district court concluded that the two songwriters
were not joint authors, and the second songwriter had no ownership claim
whatsoever in the revised song. On appeal, the Second Circuit did not adopt the
district court's reasoning; instead, it held that the second writer's contribution was a
work made for hire, leaving her with no authorship rights at all. 225 Thus, the Second
Circuit reached the same outcome as the district court, but employed a different
rationale-the implied assignment of authorship rights.
As these cases demonstrate, courts applying the 1909 Act embraced the "common
design" requirement for joint authorship that still persists today. However, a lack of
guidance under the 1909 Act made it difficult for the courts to resolve joint
authorship claims that today would be analyzed as derivative works claims, leading
them in some cases to reject contributors' claims under an implied assignment theory
derived from nineteenth-century case law on commissioned works.
As discussed in Part IV below, Congress rejected the implied assignment concept
in the 1976 Act and clarified the law regarding works made for hire, joint works,
collective works, and derivative works. However, even after the 1976 Act drew these
lines more clearly, the "winner-take-all" approach of the nineteenth century and
cases decided under the 1909 Act resurfaced in a series of paradigm-shifting cases
involving dramatic works, in which courts quietly reintroduced the implied
assignment theory, elevating outdated case law over the plain language of the
copyright statutes. As will be seen, these decisions demonstrate a continued
preference for the concept of the romantic author with respect to dramatic works, in
ironic contrast to the collaborative origins of Anglo-American drama.

223.

See infra notes 245-277 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit took Edward B. Marks

Music one step further in the much-criticized Twelfth Street Rag case, which held that a song was a joint
work even though the composer had created the music purely as an instrumental piece, after which the

assignee of his copyright hired a writer to add lyrics. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955), modified on reh 'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (the Twelfth Street Rag
case). For criticism of the case, see Cary, supra note 206, at 92; Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14,
22 (2d Cir. 1976); Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 242 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1957). The definition of
a "joint work" in the 1976 Act legislatively overruled the Twelfth Street Rag doctrine by requiring that
both joint authors have the intent to merge their contributions into a single unitary work at the time they

make those contributions. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "joint work"); see Batiste v. Island Records,
Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 222 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the legislative overruling); Corbello v. DeVito, 844 F.
Supp. 2d 1136, 1160 (D. Nev. 2012) (similar), rev'd in part, vacated in part, remanded on other grounds,

777 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2015); see also infra notes 228-231 and accompanying text. Today, the song

would be considered a derivative work, because it was an adaptation of a preexisting work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (definition of "derivative work").

224. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, 314 F. Supp. 640, 645, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d
1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
225. Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1215.
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IV. THE 1976 ACT: THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF JOINT
AUTHORSHIP
A.

STATUTORY CHANGES

The Copyright Act of 1976 Act eliminated many of the ambiguities of the 1909
Act. It defined joint works, derivative works, and works made for hire, replaced the
undefined "composite works" category with a more clearly defined concept of
"collective works," and expressly addressed the scope of copyright protection for
226
It also eliminated the doctrine of implied
collective works and derivative works.
and exclusive licenses to be in
assignments
assignment by requiring all copyright
227
writing.
The 1976 Act provided, for the first time in federal copyright law, a statutory
definition of a joint work: "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
228
To interpret this definition, courts have
interdependent parts of a unitary whole."
House Report, in which the
accompanying
the
of
language
the
relied heavily on
manifest:
is
law
case
prior
influence of
[A] work is "joint" if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors
would be
prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it
parts
interdependent
or
"inseparable
as
authors
other
of
merged with the contributions
of a unitary whole." The touchstone here is the intention, at the time the writing is done,
that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit, although the parts
themselves may be either "inseparable" (as the case of a novel or painting) or
"interdependent" (as in the case of a motion picture, opera, or the words and music of
2 29
a song).

The temporal aspect of the joint works definition-requiring that both of the parties
already intend to merge their contributions at the time they create their
230
It carries forward
contributions-distinguishes joint works from derivative works.
the "common design" requirement adopted by Judges Keating and Montague Smith
231
in the nineteenth-century English case of Levy v. Rutley.
to
Despite these statutory clarifications, the concept of joint authorship continued
of
trouble the federal courts. Their concerns focused on two issues: (1) the nature
226. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (definitions of "joint work," "derivative work," "work made for hire,"
"collective work," and "compilation").
227. Id. § 204(a).
228. Id. § 101 (definition of "joint work"). It also corrected such judicial missteps as the doctrine
of the Twelfth Street Rag case. See supra note 223.

229. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736-37. Cases
relying on this language include Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991);
Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743, 763 (D.P.R. 1995); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller,
P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 258-59 (D. Neb. 1982).
230.

Under the 1976 Act, a derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works,"

in which the preexisting work is "recast, transformed, or adapted."
"derivative work").
See supra notes 164-180 and accompanying text.
231.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of
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the contribution that a collaborator must make; and (2) the type of intent that a
collaborator must harbor.
With respect to the first issue, the vast majority of courts held that a joint author's
contribution must consist of copyrightable expression rather than abstract ideas. 232
Although one case from the Seventh Circuit entertained the possibility that, under
certain circumstances, contributing ideas may be enough, 233 this has not altered the
majority view.
The second issue-the nature of the intent necessary to create a joint work-has
been more problematic. In addressing this question, three circuit courts have felt the
need to go beyond the statutory language, adding a judicial gloss that amounts to a
heightened intent requirement. The trend began with the Second Circuit, then spread
to the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Remarkably, each of the cases announcing this
heightened standard did so in the specific context of dramatic works.
Before examining the case law, it is worth noting the common factor that links the
three circuits that developed this heightened standard: These circuits exercise
geographic jurisdiction over three American cities that are especially renowned for
the creation and execution of dramatic works, either for live performance or for
filmed entertainment: New York (Second Circuit), Chicago (Seventh Circuit), and
Los Angeles (Ninth Circuit). That these three circuits should emerge as the standardbearers for a rule that favors sole authorship over collaborative authorship could, of
course, be mere coincidence. Alternatively, it could reflect the courts' desireconscious or otherwise-to protect the established hierarchies of the commercial
entertainment industries that contribute to their regional economies. 234 Whatever
their motivation, the courts' reasoning in these cases reflects a mindset predisposed
toward the romantic notion of sole authorship-in contradistinction to the historical
roots of collaborative dramatic writing.
B.

SECOND CIRCUIT: SETTING A NEW STANDARD

After the 1976 Act took effect, the first series of joint authorship decisions from
courts in the Second Circuit applied the new statutory test without embellishment.
These decisions assessed the nature and substantiality of each person's creative
contribution and analyzed (sometimes cursorily) whether, at the time the parties
made their contributions, each had the intent to merge those contributions into a
unitary work. These courts did not inquire whether the parties viewed one another
as joint authors or intended to share credit for the work, or whether one party

232. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (collecting cases).
233. See Gaiman v. McFarland, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering multiple
contributors to a comic book).
234. The Sixth Circuit-with jurisdiction over Nashville-might be expected to follow suit.
Although the Court of Appeals itself has not had occasion to address the intent requirement for joint works,
See, e.g., Navarro v. Procter

&

several district courts have already adopted the heightened standard.

Gamble Co., 515 F. Supp. 3d 718, 748 (S.D. Ohio 2021); Corwin v. Quinonez, 858 F. Supp. 2d 903, 91011 (N.D. Ohio 2012); Tang v. Putruss, 521 F. Supp. 600, 606-07 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
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exercised more creative control over the project. Notably, none of these cases
235
involved dramatic works.
While most of these early decisions were at the district court level, there was one
detailed opinion from the Second Circuit. The 1989 case of Weissmann v. Freeman
236
Weissman had written a
involved an authorship dispute between two physicians.
she had jointly authored
works
earlier
from
material
book chapter that incorporated
him a joint author of
made
also
this
that
claimed
Freeman
with Freeman, and
Circuit stated that
Second
the
claim,
Freeman's
rejecting
In
Weissman's chapter.
work at the time
a
joint
to
contribute
to
intend
"must
work
a
joint
each co-author of
237
any other intent
impose
not
did
It
made."
is
contribution
his or her alleged
requirement.
Just two years later, however, the Second Circuit adopted a significantly different
approach when faced with a joint authorship claim involving a play. To understand
how the court could change its analysis so quickly requires taking a closer look at
dictum from an intervening district court decision.
Fisher v. Klein was a 1990 case from the Southern District of New York that
238
Judge Leval's actual holding in that case was
involved a jewelry design.
with the definition of joint works under
consistent
entirely
was
it
as
unremarkable,
joint authors, because both made
were
designers
two
The
Act:
the 1976
their contributions into a single
merge
to
intent
the
with
copyrightable contributions
239
two district court cases from
distinguished
judge
the
however,
In dictum,
design.
joint works authored by the
not
were
plans
architectural
that
holding
other circuits
240
Although the client in each of those cases failed to make
architect and the client.
a sufficient copyrightable contribution to the plans, and could have been denied joint
241
Judge Leval suggested that the clients were
authorship status on that basis alone,
not joint authors for another, independent reason:
It does not follow that because suggestions are made and adopted that a joint copyright
has been created, because there is this additional requirement of the shared intention
that the contributions be merged into a unitary whole, that is to say, into a work

235. See Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989) (chapter in medical book); Fisher v.
Klein, 1990 WL 10072477 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990) (jewelry design); Morita v. Omni Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd.,
741 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (photograph), vacatedpursuant to consent judgment, 760 F.
Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Geshwind v. Garrick, 734 F. Supp. 644, 651 & n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (computer
graphics animation), aff'd without op., 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991); Strauss v. Hearst Corp., No. 85 Civ.
10017, 1988 WL 18932, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988) (photograph); Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v.
Material Things, No. 82 Civ. 7187, 1984 WL 532 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1984) (fabric design); Mister B
Textiles Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (fabric design).
236. 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
237. Id. at 1318.
238. Fisher v. Klein, 1990 WL 10072477 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990).
239. Id. at *6.
240. Id. (citing Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Neb. 1982); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981)).
241. Aitken, 542 F. Supp. at 259 (finding that client's contribution was either an uncopyrightable
idea or de minimis); Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857 (finding that client contributed only uncopyrightable
ideas).
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of joint authorship.

It is only where that dominant author intends to be sharing
authorship thatjoint authorship will result.2 42

Although Judge Leval cited no supporting authorities, the first sentence of this
dictum is consistent with two sources over a century apart: (1) the statutory
definition of joint works in the 1976 Act; 243 and (2) the 1871 decision of the Court
of Common Pleas in Levy v. Rutley-specifically, the opinion of Judge Montague
Smith. 2 44 In contrast, the second sentence does not appear to be based on any
authority, either statutory or judicial. Thus, Judge Leval left no clue as to why he
converted the intent to merge contributions into an intent to share authorship-or
what he meant by such intent.
In addition, this passage marks the first appearance of the phrase "dominant
author" in any law report. Judge Leval's opinion made no attempt to define this term,
and offered no hint of how he derived it.
One year after Fisherv. Klein, the Second Circuit relied heavily on Judge Leval's
dictum when it decided Childress v. Taylor, a joint authorship dispute involving a
play, and the most influential joint authorship opinion ever issued in the United
States. 245 When actress Clarice Taylor became interested in creating a play about
"Moms" Mabley, she gathered historical material and asked Alice Childress, an
experienced playwright, to do the writing. 246 Most of Taylor's contributions
consisted of uncopyrightable research, although she did suggest one scene. 247 Some
ideas for additional scenes came out of her research, but even she could not recall
who suggested them. 248 Thus, at most, Taylor contributed uncopyrightable facts and
some general ideas. After the play's initial production, Taylor decided to produce a
revised version of the play, but Childress sued her for infringement. Taylor argued
that she was a joint author of the play, while Childress asserted sole authorship. 249
Judge Newman expressly adopted the majority rule that a joint author must
contribute copyrightable material, and could easily have rejected Taylor's claim on
this basis alone, without adopting any new gloss on the "joint work" definition. 250
Instead, however, he seized on Judge Leval's dictum in Fisher v. Klein. Adopting
Leval's modified version of the "intent" requirement as well as his novel concept of
the "dominant author," Judge Newman used this as his sole rationale for denying
Taylor's joint authorship claim:

242.
243.

Fisher, 1990 WL 10072477 at *6 (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "joint work").

244.

See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.

245. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). Childress is the joint authorship precedent
cited most frequently by the federal courts, and has been cited in virtually every joint authorship opinion
since 1991.
246. Id. at 502.
247. The scene involved a speaker in Harlem. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 503-04.
250. Id. at 503-04, 506-07.
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What distinguishes the writer-editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship
from the true joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both participants in the
venture to regard themselves as joint authors.
Focusing on whether the putative joint authors regarded themselves as joint authors is
where one person
especially important in circumstances, such as the instant case,
the only issue is
and
work
the
of
author
dominant
the
(Childress) is indisputably
25 1
joint authors.
are
(Taylor)
whether that person is the sole author or she and another

In announcing this rule, the Second Circuit used the concept of the "dominant
author" to empower one author to unilaterally prevent other collaborators from being
made no
recognized as co-authors. Like Judge Leval before him, Judge Newman
it is
definition,
a
Without
author."
"dominant
attempt to define what he meant by a
"indisputably"
was
collaborator
one
hard to see how the court could conclude that
dominant. Nor did Judge Newman explain why one person's dominance in the
creative process should end the inquiry into another person's authorship. The
"dominant author" label thus became outcome-determinative without ever being
252
defined or justified.
Even as he established this high bar for co-authorship of dramatic works, Judge
Newman suggested that the bar should be lower for non-dramatic works. The
"requires less
question of how the contributors regarded one another, he asserted,
such as
collaboration,
of
forms
traditional
of
exacting consideration in the context
253
embraced
explicitly
he
Thus,
song."
a
of
music
between the creators of words and
a double standard, apparently based on his personal perception of the genres in which
collaboration was traditional. Even though he acknowledged that "[c]o-authorship
254
Judge Newman was seemingly unaware that
was well known to the common law,"
dates back to at least the sixteenth
writing
dramatic
the tradition of collaborative
255
century.
The Childresscourt's eagerness to embrace a non-statutory narrowing of the joint
works definition in the specific context of dramatic works also reflected its fear of
the legal consequences of taking a more generous view of multiple authorship:
The insistence on copyrightable contributions by all putative joint authors might serve
the fruits of
to prevent some spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to share
of having
claim
a
though
even
work,
copyrightable
a
of
author
sole
a
of
the efforts
contributed copyrightable material could be asserted by those so inclined....
The wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the state of mind
regarding the unitary nature of the finished work-an intention "that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." However, an

251. Id. at 507-08.
252. This became apparent a few years later in Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998),
when the Second Circuit applied the "dominant author" concept to reject a joint authorship claim by a
infra notes 270collaborator even though she had made a copyrightable contribution to the work. See
text.
271 and accompanying

253.
254.

Childress,945 F.2d at 508.
Id. at 504.

255.

See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
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inquiry so limited would extend joint author status to many persons who are not likely
to have been within the contemplation of Congress. 25 6

Whatever parade of horribles the court was envisioning here, there is no evidence in
the legislative history that Congress intended to give courts the discretion to apply a
more demanding test than it had expressed in the statute itself 257 However, Judge
Newman's fears echo the concern over conflicting claimants that Judge Byles
expressed in his 1871 opinion in Levy v. Rutley. 258 They also suggest that Judge
Newman was influenced by a preference for the romantic view of authorship as the
product of solitary genius rather than an intertwining of creative contributions from
multiple sources-the same preference that led seventeenth-century literary critics to
disparage collaborative playwriting. 259
Although Judge Newman relied heavily on Judge Leval's "dominant author"
dictum from Fisher v. Klein, he also invoked several 1909 Act cases to support his
novel interpretation of the 1976 Act. One of these was Maurel v. Smith, the 1915
case in which Judge Learned Hand ruled in favor of a joint authorship claim
involving a dramatic-musical work. 260 However, rather than recognizing Maurel as
contrary or, at best, neutral authority decided under a long-repealed statute, 261 Judge
Newman simply referenced Learned Hand's finding that the authors in Maurel
"agreed to a joint authorship in the piece, and ... accepted whatever the law implied
as to the rights and obligations which arose from such an undertaking," 262 as though
this fact finding from a 1915 case should control the interpretation of the 1976 Act. 263
The second 1909 Act case on which Judge Newman relied was Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., in which the Monty Python comedy troupe
sued ABC for infringing a television script. 264 Gilliam stated that no joint work exists

256.
257.

Childress, 945 F.2d at 507-08.
Neither the statutory definition of a "joint work," 17 U.S.C. § 101, nor the sparse legislative

history addressing that definition, see supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text, indicates that
Congress intended courts to exclude particular kinds of contributors.

258. Levy v. Rutley [1871] L.R. 6 C.P. 523.
259. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
260. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
261. Maurel was decided under the 1909 Act, which was repealed and replaced by the 1976 Act.
262. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508 (quoting Maurel, 220 F. at 198).
263. Judge Newman also cited the Second Circuit's opinion in Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d
1313 (2d Cir. 1989), which addressed an authorship dispute between two physicians under the 1976 Act.
Weissman had written a book chapter that incorporated material from earlier works she had jointly
authored with Freeman. In rejecting Freeman's claim that he was a joint author of the chapter, the
Weissman court stated that each co-author "must intend to contribute to a joint work at the time his or her

alleged contribution is made." Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1318. Judge Newman quoted this passage, see
Childress, 945 F.2d at 508, without noting the language that immediately followed it: "Because § 103(b)
extends independent protection to derivative works, an intent to contribute or an actual contribution to

previous works does not serve as proof of ownership in the derivative work." Weissman, 868 F.2d at
1318. Because the distinction between joint and derivative works was not at issue in Childress, Weissman
does not provide the support that Newman implied.

264.

Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1976). The troupe had licensed

the BBC to create, broadcast, and license the transmission of a program based on their script, but expressly

retained all other rights in the script, including the right to license it to other parties in the future. ABC
was the BBC's licensee. Id. at 22.
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unless "'at the time of creation by the first author, the second author's contribution
that
[is envisaged] as an integrated part of a single work,' and the first author intends
265
the
with
consistent
was
that
viewpoint
a
work,"
a
joint
be
product
the final
ultimately
rule
the
as
well
as
design"
"common
a
of
requirement
law
common
their
adopted in the 1976 Act. The troupe's contractual retention of most rights in
the
with
script
their
created
troupe
the
that
claim
defendants'
the
script contradicted
intent to merge it with the BBC's contribution in order to produce a single joint
work. 266 This context is important to understanding the Gilliam court's statement267
which Judge Newman quoted out of context -that the parties' explicit licensing
arrangement indicated that they "did not consider themselves joint authors of a single
work." 268 Simply put, the troupe did not intend to merge their script with the BBC's
contributions in order to produce a unitary work; they intended to license their
completed script to the BBC for the creation of a derivative work.
269
the Childress opinion has had
Despite the flaws in Judge Newman's reasoning,
far-reaching influence on the joint works doctrine. Its influence has been most
pronounced, however, in cases involving collaborative dramatic works, including
both plays and motion pictures.
The Second Circuit's next application of the dominant author/shared intent
analysis once again involved the authorship of a play. In Thomson v. Larson, the
district court found that dramaturg Lynn Thomson had made copyrightable
contributions to the Pulitzer- and Tony-winning musical Rent, including some of the
270
Despite
dialogue, even though Jonathan Larson was credited as the sole author.
Thomson's contributions, Judge Calabresi rejected her joint authorship claim for the
sole reason that Larson never intended to share authorship with her: "Childress
makes clear that the contribution even of significant language to a work does not

265.

Id. (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 202, §§ 67-73).

Gilliam also rejected the

defendants' attempt to argue that the television program was a joint work under the Twelfth Street Rag
in
doctrine, pointing out that the analysis in that case had been roundly criticized and arguably rejected
the Second Circuit. Id.

266.
267.
268.

Id. Specifically, they retained all rights that were not expressly granted to the BBC. Id.
Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 22.

Judge Newman also cited, without explanation, see Childress,945 F.2d at 508, the original trial
269.
court opinion in PictureMusic, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd on other

grounds, 457 F.2d 1213, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972). The trial court in that case found that: (1) the writer of a

song did not collaborate with a second songwriter who, with the copyright owner's permission, made
subsequent revisions to the song for publication; and (2) the latter's revisions were not substantial enough
to amount to joint authorship. PictureMusic, 314 F. Supp. at 647. However, the appellate court rejected

the trial court's analysis, and affirmed the decision on grounds unrelated to joint authorship, holding that
the revisions were a work made for hire under the 1909 Act. PictureMusic, 457 F.2d at 1215. In addition,
the appellate court expressly declined to decide whether the reviser's contributions would be substantial
enough for joint authorship. Id. Thus, neither the trial court nor the appellate opinions in that case support
Judge Newman's reasoning.

270.

Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201 & n.14, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998). Her revisions produced

"a radical transformation of the show." Id. at 198, 203--04. See also Ben Brantley, EnterSinging: Young,

Hopeful and Taking on the Big Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1996, at C13 (review of 1996 Broadway
opening).
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automatically suffice to confer co-author status on the contributor. Under Childress,
a specific finding of mutual intent remains necessary. "271
Thomson, it turns out, was not the only uncredited writer who contributed to the
play. After Larson's sudden death shortly before the play's opening, three other
writers worked with Thomson "to fine-tune the script." 272 Those three, however,
signed waivers disclaiming any copyright interest; only Thomson refused. 273 With
so many writers contributing to the script after Larson's death, the court's reliance
on Larson's desire to be the sole author seems misplaced.
Ironically, Judge Calabresi's opinion openly acknowledged that Rent originated
as "the joint project of Billy Aronson and composer Jonathan Larson." 274 The
collaborative origin of the work, combined with the contributions of multiple
uncredited writers, mirrors the collaborative foundations of English-language drama,
but was insufficient to shake the Second Circuit's predisposition in favor of romantic
authorship.
The Second Circuit declined to rule on whether Thomson owned the copyright in
her contributions to Rent.275 Although the court thereby avoided finding an implied
assignment, this still left her ownership rights -in a legal limbo. The fragments she
was left with may have had no separate marketability and might have been useful
only in suing the producers for infringement. 276
In other cases, courts in the Second Circuit have repeatedly applied the Childress
test to motion pictures, 277 using the rule to deny joint authorship status to creative
contributors even though their contributions were not works made for hire. 278 In one
271. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202. Even though Larson had died several months before Thomson
asserted her joint authorship claim, and thus could not testify as to his intent, Judge Calabresi inferred his
intent from several pieces of evidence: (1) Thomson's own statements that, during the creative
process,
she presented her contributions as suggestions which Larson had the power to accept or reject, id. at 203;
(2) Larson's unilateral decision to credit himself as author and Thomson as "dramaturg" on the Rent script

and to describe himself as the "author/composer" in the biography he submitted to Playbill, id. at 203-04;
(3) Larson's decision to name himself as the author in the contract with the New York Theater Workshop
(the off-Broadway theater which initially produced the play), id. at 204; and (4) Larson's vehement
rejections of the theater's repeated suggestions that he work with another writer in order to improve the

script, even though he eventually agreed to accept Ms. Thomson's help, id.
272. Id. at 198.
273. Id. at 198 n.7.
274. Id. at 197. When they ended their collaboration, they entered an agreement authorizing Larson
to continue the project on his own. Id. The agreement specified that Aronson would "not . .. be
considered [an] active collaborator or co-author," but that he would be publicly credited for the "[o]riginal

concept and additional lyrics." Id.
275. Id. at 206. For this reason, it also did not address the possibility of an implied license. Id.
276. See David Letkowitz, Original Rent Cast-Member Rapp Speaks Out on DramaturgLawsuit,
PLAYBILL (June 24, 1998), https://perma.cc/WC5T-CC6Y. The parties eventually settled out of court.
Jesse McKinley, Family of "Rent" CreatorSettles Suit Over Authorship, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998, at

&

B3.
277. Marshall v. Marshall, 504 F. App'x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2012) (unpub.).
278. Brooks v. Dash, 852 F. App'x 40,41-42 (2d Cir. 2021) (mem.); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin,
791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015); Webber v. Dash, 19 Civ. 610, 2019 WL 1213008 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2019);
Horror, Inc. v. Miller, 335 F. Supp. 3d 273 (D. Conn. 2018) (appeal filed); Lindsay v. The Wrecked
Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248, 1999 WL 816163, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
In holding that a director had no authorship rights in his film, the 16 Casa Duse court found it unnecessary
to reach the producer's alternative argument that, if the director owned any copyright in the film, he had
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case involving a film, the district court went so far as to declare that mutual intent to
279
share authorship "is the sine qua non of the co-authorship inquiry" -despite the
fact that it is nowhere mentioned in the 1976 Act or its legislative history.
The Second Circuit courts have also been fairly consistent in applying Childress
280
with one notable exception. In Perry
to other categories of copyrightable works,
scientific manuscript, the Southern
a
involving
case
a
v. Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.,
281
The court instead relied on
completely.
Childress
District of New York ignored
282
as well
medical article)
a
involving
case
pre-Childress
Weissman v. Freeman (the
283
as
paper,
scientific
a
involving
circuit
different
a
from
as a district court case
is
This
standard.
different
a
merits
category
a
though scientific writing as
that
Childress
in
statement
express
Newman's
permissible, of course, under Judge
some works of authorship can be subjected to a less demanding test than dramatic
works. 284 It is also consistent with a bias in favor of romantic authorship for highly
creative works, and a greater tolerance for multiple authorship of fact-based works.
C.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT: TREATING DRAMATIC WORKS DIFFERENTLY

The preference for romantic authorship of dramatic works is even more
pronounced in the Seventh Circuit. In this circuit, dramatic works have been subject
to a more demanding joint works analysis than any other category of copyrightable
works.
As was true in the Second Circuit, courts in the Seventh Circuit at first applied the
1976 Act's joint authorship test without adding any additional requirements. None
21
of these early cases involved dramatic works. 8 However, Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., the first case under the 1976 Act that reached the Court of Appeals, did

granted an implied license to the producer. In dictum, however, the court suggested that the implied
license approach was unsatisfactory since the license would be rescindable. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at

259 n.5.
279. Webber, 2019 WL 1213008, at *5.
280. See Richard J. Zitz, Inc. v. Pereira, 225 F.3d 646, 2000 WL 1239830, at *4 (2d Cir. 2000)
(unpub.) (architectural work); CDS Inc. v. Zetler, 298 F. Supp. 3d 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (software);
Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (song); SHL Imaging,
Inc., v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (photographs); Maurizio v.
Goldsmith, 84 F. Supp. 2d 455, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (novel), aff'd on other grounds, 230 F.3d 518
(2d Cir. 2000); Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (sweater
designs); Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (songs).
281. Perry v. Mary Ann Liebert Inc., No. 17-CV-5600, 2018 WL 2561029 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018).
282. Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989) (cited by Perry, 2018 WL 2561029, at *9).
283. Mallon v. Marshall, 95 F. Supp. 3d 274, 277 (D. Mass. 2015) (cited by Perry, 2018 WL
2561029, at *9).
284. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991) (requiring "less exacting consideration
in the context of traditional forms of collaboration, such as between the creators of words and music of a

song").
285. See Bodenstab v. J.R. Blank & Assocs., Inc.,
(software), vacated on other grounds on reconsideration
Johnstone v. Fox, No. 85 C 3179, 1987 WL 45233, at *3
design); Eckert v. Hurley Chi. Co., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 699,

1990 WL 251818 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 1990)
by 1991 WL 33647 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1991);
(N.D. 111. June 12, 1987) (drawing of kitchen
702-04 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (sales brochure).
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involve a dramatic work. 286 In that decision, the Seventh Circuit adopted the
Childressapproach.
Erickson involved three plays developed through an improvisational rehearsal
process. 287 The theater company asserted joint authorship based on the contributions
made by its actors during the development of the plays, but the Seventh Circuit
rejected the claim, expressly adopting the Childress requirement of intent to share
authorship:
[Actor Michael Osborne] conceded that whether his contributions were included and
where they went into the compilation were entirely [writer] Ms. Erickson's decisions.
Furthermore, neither Ms. Erickson nor Trinity considered any of the actors to be coauthors with her in Much Ado. . . . Similarly with Prairie Voices, Ms. Erickson
provided the stories on which the play was based, and she decided which of the actors'
suggestions were incorporated into the script. The actors did not consider themselves
to be joint authors with Ms. Erickson, and there is no evidence that Ms. Erickson
considered the actors as co-authors of the script. Because Trinity cannot establish the
requisite intent for Much Ado or PrairieVoices, the actors cannot be considered joint
authors for the purposes of copyright protection. 2 88

Only after reaching this conclusion did the court note that the actors could not
identify their specific contributions to the plays. 289 Yet this evidentiary failure, by
itself, would have been sufficient grounds to reject the theater's joint authorship
claim under a straightforward reading of the statute. Here, again, a federal court went
out of its way to narrow the statutory definition of a joint work in order to lend
support to the tacit presumption that dramatic writing is not collaborative.
The Seventh Circuit quickly abandoned this approach when faced with a dispute
that did not involve a dramatic work. Decided just three years after Erickson,
Seshadri v. Kasraian involved a student and a professor who collaborated on an
academic article. 290 In holding that they were joint authors, Judge Posner's opinion
focused only on the fact of collaboration and the substantiality of each party's
contribution. 291 Posner cited Childress and Erickson, but only for the rule that "a
collaborator must contribute significant copyrightable material"; he did not mention
those courts' holdings that the joint authors must intend to share authorship with one
another. 292 While Posner found it relevant that the parties' initial manuscript listed
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 803 ("Anyone reading the correspondence between Seshadri and Kasraian would

conclude that the article was indeed a joint work.").

In that correspondence, the professor expressly

acknowledged that both had contributed written expression. Id. at 802-03. Noting that the article listed
the student's name first, Judge Posner observed that "it would be odd for a senior professor to list a
graduate student's name before his own if the student had contributed nothing more to the article than the
usual assistance that a research assistant provides." Id. at 803. Because the judge did not cite any evidence

from the record supporting his opinion as to normal practice in professional academic writing, he may
have been relying on his own experience as a law professor. See RichardA. PosnerFaculty Web
Page,

UNIV. CHI., https://perma.cc/RUR2-D39D (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
292. Seshadri, 130 F.3d at 803.
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both parties as authors, placing the student's name first, he found this significant not
as an indication of intent to share authorship but merely as evidence that the student
293
At no point did he acknowledge
contributed "significant copyrightable material."
had adopted in Erickson to
court
own
his
that
test
the
from
departing
that he was
applied a significantly
Circuit
Seventh
the
result,
a
As
reject joint authorship claims.
applied to dramatic
had
it
than
writing
academic
to
test
authorship
joint
less stringent
earlier.
years
three
just
works
In the years that followed, the Seventh Circuit continued to apply a less
demanding joint authorship test in cases that did not involve dramatic works, even
when the works in question were highly creative. For example, Gaiman v.
294
With Judge Posner
McFarlaneinvolved the authorship of comic book characters.
authorship by the
sole
of
a
claim
rejected
court
the
opinion,
the
writing
once again
the characters'
of
creator
the
that
instead
holding
characters,
the
drew
who
artist
295
discuss the
not
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Posner
Judge
author.
a
joint
was
dialogue
and
descriptions
of their
nature
the
on
solely
focused
analysis
his
instead,
all;
at
parties' intent
296
whether
assessing
for
standard
a
relaxed
applied
also
He
respective contributions.
297
each author had made a sufficient contribution to the work.
Just two years after Gaiman, another Seventh Circuit panel revealed a sharp split
over Erickson's intent requirement. In a 2009 case involving joint authorship of a
song, Janky v. Lake County Convention & Visitors Bureau, one band member
second band
(Janky) wrote a song, then accepted the revised lyrics suggested by a298
Applying
member, but later argued that she, Janky, was the song's sole author.
Erickson, the magistrate agreed that the two writers did not intend to be co-authors,
and that the second writer's lyric revisions were too "minimal" to be copyrightable
299
However, a split Seventh Circuit panel disagreed, ruling that the
contributions.
3
song was a joint work. 00 In contrast to the magistrate, the majority construed
Erickson to require only: (1) copyrightable contributions from each party; and (2)
an "intent to work together in the creation of a single product," which the court
expressly distinguished from an "intent to recognize each other as co-authors for
301
The majority found the requisite intent based on: (1)
purposes of copyright law."
the second band member's degree of control over the finished product; and (2)
changed her
Janky's initial characterization of the work as joint, even though she
302
rather
expression
Because the lyric revisions were significant concrete
mind later.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 658-59.
Id. at 659 ("The decisions that say, rightly in the generality of cases, that each contributor to a

weren't thinking of the
joint work must make a contribution that if it stood alone would be copyrightable
process that had
creative
particular
the
of
nature
the
of
because
alone
stand
couldn't
case in which it

produced it.").
298. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 359-60 (7th Cir. 2009).
299. Id. at 361.
300. Id. at 363.
301. Id. at 362.
302. Id.
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than mere ideas, the song was a joint work. 303 The dissent, in contrast, called for a
stricter application of Erickson and Childress, requiring proof that the parties
"intended to be joint authors." 304 The dissent also believed the lyric revisions to be
uncopyrightable ideas. 305
The Seventh Circuit continued to ignore Erickson'sheightened intent requirement
in Sullivan v. Flora, Inc., a case involving illustrations that an artist created for use
in a company's advertising campaigns. 306 Quoting the joint authorship test in Janky,
and failing to even mention Erickson, the court approved a jury instruction on joint
works that required only an intent to merge contributions, rather than an intent to
share authorship. 307
The emerging pattern in the Seventh Circuit is striking. As noted earlier, the
district courts in the Second Circuit have been somewhat consistent in applying
Childress to non-dramatic works, 308 with one notable exception. 309 In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit has been strangely consistent in its inconsistency: After taking a
hard line on joint authorship of dramatic works in Erickson, the Seventh Circuit took
a decidedly softer stance in the context of other works.
D.

NINTH CIRCUIT: AN UNCERTAIN STANDARD

In the Ninth Circuit, joint authorship cases under the 1976 Act applied only the
statutory requirements until the early 1990s. 310 After the decisions in Childress and
Erickson, cases in the Ninth Circuit became inconsistent, with some decisions
continuing the earlier approach 31' (including a case involving a screenplay 3 12), and
others beginning to apply the heightened intent requirement.313 In a striking example

303. Id. at 363.
304. Id. at 364-65 (Ripple, J., dissenting). Rather than referencing Childress directly, the dissent
cited Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998). Thomson is discussed supra notes 270-276 and
accompanying text.

305.
306.
307.

Janky, 576 F.3d at 365 (Ripple, J.,

308.

See supra note 280 and accompanying text.

dissenting).
Sullivan v. Flora, Inc., 936 F.3d 562, 575 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id.

309. See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
310. See Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 520-22 (9th Cir. 1990) (software); S.O.S., Inc.
v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1989) (software); Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp.
727, 731-32 (D. Ariz. 1985) (letters). In Ashton-Tate and S.O.S., the court did not reach the intent
requirement, because it found that only one party contributed copyrightable expression.

311. Leicester v. Warner Bros., No. CV95-4058-HLH(CTX), 1998 WL 34016724, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
May 29, 1998) (architectural work), aff'd, 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000); Johannsen v. Brown, 797 F.
Supp. 835, 842 (D. Or. 1992) (illustration).
312. Bencich v. Hoffman, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055-56 (D. Az. 2000) (finding intent to merge
contributions). The district court issued this opinion just a few days after the Ninth Circuit adopted the
heightened intent requirement in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), and did not take
account of that decision.

313. Campbell v. Lavery, 106 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (software);
Vondran v. McLinn, No. C 95-20296, 1995 WL 415153, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 1995) (article for trade
publication); Konigsberg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, No. CV 91-6398, 1992 WL 315225, at *1 & n.2 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 1992) (treatment for novel and other projects).
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of a court subjecting dramatic works to differential treatment, one district court
314
expressly held that Childress applied to plays but not to sound recordings.
In 2000, however, the Ninth Circuit created its own version of the heightened
intent requirement, and it did so in the context of dramatic works-specifically,
motion pictures. Aalmuhammed v. Lee involved a dispute over the authorship of a
motion picture that arose when a film producer failed to secure a work-made-for-hire
agreement from one of the film's creative participants, who later asserted joint
15
In addition to requiring that each author make a copyrightable
authorship.3
contribution to the joint work, the Ninth Circuit applied three criteria for treating a
contributor as a joint author: (1) the collaborator must "superintend" the work by
"exercising control"; (2) the "putative coauthors [must] make object manifestations
turn on
of a shared intent to be coauthors"; and (3) the work's audience appeal must 316
The
appraised."
be
cannot
success
its
in
each
of
share
"the
and
both contributions
important
most
the
be
will
cases
many
in
"[c]ontrol
that
however,
court added,
factor." 317 Thus, while the Anlmuhammed test differs slightly from the Childress
test, it incorporates both the "dominant author" concept (by focusing on control) and
the requirement of intent to share authorship rather than simply an intent to merge
contributions into a unitary work.
In adopting this test, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it was following the
3 18
However,
lead of the dramatic works cases from the Second and Seventh Circuits.
Systems XIX, Inc. v. L. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1998). The court refused
314.
to apply Childress to sound recordings because of this passage in the 1976 Act's legislative history:
The copyrightable elements of a sound recording will usually, though not always, involve
"authorship" both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured and on the part of
the record producer responsible for setting up the session, capturing and electronically processing
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make a final sound recording.

the
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56 (1976)). The court also cited a similar opinion from
Copyright Office:

"Sound recording authorship may be contributed by the performer or the record

producer. Usually, authorship is contributed by both performer and producer." Id. at 1228-29
OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., § 495.01 at 400(quoting COMPENDIUM

37 (1984)).
315. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). For a detailed analysis of the case, see

in the
LaFrance, supra note 189, at 246-55; see also F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues

Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 225 (2001).

Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1231, 1234. The court drew the first two factors from Thomson,
316.
could
but modified the second factor out of concern that reliance on purely subjective statements of intent

be an instrument of fraud. Id. (citing Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998)). The court
Co. v.
also purported to draw the first factor from the pre-1909 Act case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic
a person
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884), which the Ninth Circuit inaccurately characterized as stating that
202
who poses for a photographer cannot be considered one of the authors of the photo. Aalmuhammed,
simply
which
Burrow-Giles,
in
issue
at
never
was
author(s)
the
of
identity
the
fact,
In
F.3d at 1232-33.

held that a photograph may be creative enough to qualify as a work of authorship eligible for copyright

from the
protection. See LaFrance, supra note 189, at 250-52. The Ninth Circuit drew the third factor

1944 case of Edward B. Marks Music, a case that applied the 1909 Act rather than the 1976 Act.
Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (citing Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140
F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944)); see supra notes 214-223 and accompanying text.
317. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234.
318. "The Second and Seventh Circuits have ... concluded that contribution of independently
to establish
copyrightable material to a work intended to be an inseparable whole will not suffice
authorship of a joint work." Id. at 1233.
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the Ninth Circuit's application of the judicially-heightened joint authorship test to
motion pictures is all the more remarkable because the 1976 Act created an easy
mechanism for avoiding joint authorship of motion pictures-a mechanism that is
not available for other dramatic works, such as plays, musicals, monologues, or
operas. This is the use of a written contract to create a work made for hire, a category
that was significantly clarified in the 1976 Act. Indeed, motion pictures are one of
the few types of copyrightable works for which legal authorship can be established
by contract. 319 Under the heightened joint authorship test, however, filmmakers who
neglect to undertake the simple task of using work-made-for-hire contracts can enjoy
a "second bite at the apple," enabling them to eliminate joint authorship claims even
when asserted by substantial creative contributors. Ironically, the legislative history
of the 1976 Act expressly cites motion pictures as examples of joint works-not
once, but twice. 320
Since the Aalmuhammed decision, courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the
heightened intent requirement to most, but not all, joint authorship disputes. 321 In a
pair of cases involving concert videos, the Central District of California looked for
heightened intent in one case, 322 but not the other.323 Several cases applied the
heightened intent requirement to sound recordings, 324 in spite of the earlier, 1998

319.

Those categories, which are listed in the "work made for hire" definition, include works

"specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
320.
In giving examples of joint works composed of "interdependent" rather than "inseparable"
parts, the House Report lists "a motion picture, opera, or the words and music of a song." H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, supra note 229, at 120. The Report later notes: "It is true that a motion picture would normally
be a joint rather than a collective work with respect to those authors who actually work
on the film,
although their usual status as employees for hire would keep the question of coownership from coming

up." Id.
321. See, e.g., Direct Techs. LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 836 F.3d 1059, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2016) (flash
drive design); Brod v. Gen. Publ'g Grp., Inc., 32 F. App'x 231 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that book author
was joint author of photographs even though he gave photographer sole credit in book's copyright notice);
Softketeers, Inc. v. Regal W. Corp., No. 8:19-CV-00519-JWH (JDEx), 2021 WL 1035122, at *3-4 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 10, 2021) (software); Jefferson v. Raisen, No. CV 19-9107-DMG (MAAx), 2020 WL 6440034
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2020) (finding that song was separately created derivative work rather than
continuation of joint work).

322. Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding joint
authorship).
323. Eagle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Coming Home Prods., Inc., No. CV 03-571 FMC (AJWx), 2004 WL
5642002, at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2004). In this case, the court recited and purported to apply all
three of the Aalmuhammed factors in finding joint authorship, but its analysis completely ignored the
heightened intent factor.

324. Yellowcake, Inc. v. Hyphy Music, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-0988, 2021 WL 3052535, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. July 20, 2021); Yellowcake, Inc. v. Morena Music, Inc., F. Supp. 3d 747, 763 (E.D. Cal. 2021);
Armes v. Post, No. 2:20-cv-03212-ODW (PJWx), 2020 WL 6135068, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020);
Taylor v. Universal Music Corp., Inc., No. CV 13-06412, 2014 WL 12607685, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2014); Lopez v. Musinorte Ent. Corp., No. CV 03-167 TUC DCB, 2004 WL 7324723, at *4-6 (D.
Az. Dec. 29, 2004), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 2007 WL 579746 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2007)
(mem.).
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opinion holding that the requirement did not apply to sound recordings.
326
but
requirement,
intent
heightened
the
applied
cases involving artwork, one court
327
the other did not.
Several of the post-Aalmuhammed cases can only be described as peculiar. In
what amounts to a double time-warp, the Ninth Circuit in Richlin v. Metro-GoldwynMayer Pictures, Inc.,328 applied Aalmuhammed to a motion picture that was made in
the 1960s, and which was, therefore, governed by the 1909 Act. The court asserted,
however, that the 1976 Act's definition of joint works simply reflected the case law
330
329
Another oddity is Corbello v. Devito,
that had developed under the 1909 Act.
which involved an unpublished biography that was used as source material for the
musical Jersey Boys. Musician Tommy DeVito asked writer Rex Woodard to write
his biography, and the two executed a contract stating that Woodard would do the
writing, DeVito would have "absolute and exclusive control over the final text," and
331
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both of them would be listed as co-authors.
DeVito merely looked the text over
and
work,
creative
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all
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found Woodard to be the sole author, because DeVito's contributions were probably
not substantial enough to be copyrightable. Ironically, the court allowed authorship

325. Systems XIX, Inc. v. L. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476 (1976)); see supra note 314 and accompanying text.
326. Moi v. Chihuly Studio, Inc., No. C17-0853RSL, 2019 WL 2548511, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June
20, 2019), aff'd, 846 F. App'x 497 (9th Cir. 2021).
327. Fleming v. Miles, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1155-57 (D. Or. 2001).
328. Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 968-70 (9th Cir. 2008).
329. Id. at 968. Although the court rejected the plaintiff's claim to joint authorship of the film, its

in which the
entire joint works analysis was unnecessary. The film in question was a derivative work
treatment
plaintiff was not a creative participant. The plaintiff was merely a joint author of the underlying

and had assigned his rights in the finished treatment to the movie makers. Thus, the court reached the
right result, but for the wrong reason.

330. Corbello v. DeVito, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Nev. 2012), rev'd in part, vacated in part,
remanded, 777 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2015).
331. Id. at 1141.
332. Id. at 1163.
333. Id.
334. Id.
The idea that a contract is dispositive of joint authorship originated with the Richlin court,
335.
which mistakenly drew this inference from Aalmuhammed. Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures,

Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1127, 1234 (9th Cir.
of a
2000)). However, Aalmuhammed merely stated that a contract is "the best objective manifestation
is
contract
a
that
not
analysis,
its
in
factor
one
to
relevant
is
contract
a
that
shared intent," indicating
dispositive of the ultimate question. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235.
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to be determined by a contract that would not have met the requirements for creating
a work made for hire. 336
Perhaps the strangest-and most notorious-case of all is Garcia v. Google,
where the Ninth Circuit initially held that an actress was not a joint author of the film
in which she performed, solely because she disavowed any intent to create a joint
work; the court held instead that she possessed a separate copyright in her
"performance." 337 Although this absurd result was rejected in the en banc rehearing,
the Ninth Circuit's eventual conclusion-that the actress had no copyrightable
interest at all-was essentially the same as saying that she was not a joint author and
that she had implicitly assigned her contribution to the production company, 338 a
result that is clearly at odds with the 1976 Act's rejection of implied assignments. 339
V.

RESISTING THE ROMANTIC AUTHOR

As this history reveals, the conceit of the romantic author is alive and well in the
jurisprudence of joint works, and that jurisprudence is overwhelmingly attributable
to disputes involving dramatic works, beginning with music and texts created for live
performance, and extending more recently to motion pictures. Three leading circuits
have adopted rules that privilege a work's dominant or controlling author by imbuing
that party with the unilateral power to deny authorship status to other contributors,
regardless of the creativity and substantiality of their contributions. These circuits
have constrained joint authorship in a way that facilitates attribution to a single
creative "genius."
Under the influence of the romantic view of authorship, each of these circuits
departed from the statutory test of joint authorship by adopting a modern version of
the "implied assignment" rationale that had enabled nineteenth-century courts to
reject the authorship claims of writers and composers who created commissioned or
derivative works. 340 Too often, the effect of the heightened intent requirement has
been to strip creative contributors of their rights to share in the value of what they
create, on the theory that they implicitly agreed to surrender the rights to their
contributions. Yet Congress clearly rejected the concept of implied assignments in
the 1976 Act when it: (1) created a definition for joint works; 341 (2) required all
copyright assignments and exclusive licenses to be in writing; 342 and (3) replaced the
broad judicial concept of works made for hire with a narrower statutory definition
under which a surrender of authorship can be inferred only in a bona fide

336.

Literary works such as biographies are not eligible for work-made-for-hire contracts. 17 U.S.C.

§ 101 (definition of "work made for hire").

337. Garcia v. Google, 766 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc, 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th
Cir. 2015). The actress may have disclaimed joint authorship because she did not want to be identified as
responsible for the film's objectionable content.

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-106, 149, 180, and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "joint works").
Id. § 204(a).
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343
By adopting the conceit of the dominant author and
employment relationship.
giving that party the unilateral right to foreclose authorship claims by other
collaborators, these federal courts have undermined Congress's decision to narrow
the concept of works made for hire and restore the authorship rights of creative
workers. The rule that "dominant authors" can nullify the authorship claims of their
collaborators while reaping the benefits of their contributions is simply a thinly
disguised reincarnation of an obsolete doctrine.
In many cases, the jurisdictions that have embraced heightened scrutiny for joint
authorship of dramatic works have been disinclined to extend this analysis to other
3
works
categories of works. 44 This suggests that there is something about dramatic
among
were
works
dramatic
Historically,
conceit.
author
romantic
that triggers the
the earliest works to be scrutinized from the romantic author perspective, when the
mid-seventeenth century saw the English theater world plummet from a golden age
of collaboration to an era in which joint conception was viewed as evidence of
creative vacuity. This led many literary scholars to embrace the false narrative of
Shakespeare as a solitary genius. Could this history explain the predilection for
solitary authorship of dramatic works?
A trip across the pond suggests that this is not entirely the case. Even though the
federal law on joint works is rooted in English case law, recent decisions from the
courts of the United Kingdom have rejected a restrictive approach to joint authorship.
The UK copyright statutes define joint works in language that is similar, though not
345
Most English courts, however, have
identical, to that of federal copyright law.
intent paradigm on
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343.

Unlike a party that commissions an independent contractor, an employer does not need a signed

writing to claim authorship of an employee's work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "work made for hire"),

the author);
201(b) (stating that the person for whom the work made for hire was prepared is considered

see Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (distinguishing the two categories of
works made for hire and establishing criteria for bona fide employment relationships).
344. See supra notes 235-237, 281-284, 290-314, 327, and accompanying text.
As originally enacted, section 11(3) ofthe Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) defined
345.
joint authorship" as "a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which
of
"work
a
See
the contribution of each author is not separate from the contribution of the other author or authors."

Beckingham v. Hodgens [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143, [2004] E.C.D.R 6, para. 10. Some years later, this
by the
provision was renumbered as CDPA § 10(1) and slightly rephrased, referring to "a work produced

that of
collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinctfrom

the other author or authors." (emphasis added to highlight rephrasing). See Kogan v. Martin [2019]
EWCA (Civ) 1645, [2020] E.C.D.R. 3, para. 30.
346. Kogan, [2019] EWCA Civ 1645, paras. 48-49, 53; Beckingham, [2003] EWCA Civ 143, paras.
49-51; Bamgboye v. Reed [2002] EWHC 2922 QB, [2004] EMLR 5, para 61. Kogan also held that
decision-making authority (which party has the "final say") is not dispositive. Kogan, [2019] EWCA Civ
1645, paras. 50-51, 53. The only English case that is even partially to the contrary is Brighton v. Jones,
but
[2005] FSR 16, para. 56(iv) (stating that which author has the "final say" is a factor to be considered),
this holding was largely disapproved in Kogan, [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, para. 51.
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many co-writers, the conceit of the romantic author has not been allowed to nullify
the rights of collaborators. 347
Perhaps, then, it is the structure, economics, and power of the American
entertainment industries that have created pressure to concentrate ownership of
valuable works in the hands of a single owner, even when those properties were not
created as works made for hire. As noted earlier, 348 the three federal circuits that
have embraced the dominant author approach all have geographic jurisdiction over
regions where major industries depend on the exploitation of dramatic works.
In distorting the concept of authorship, these federal courts have done a disservice
to creative collaborators. Judicial reluctance to recognize joint authorship of
dramatic works reflects a bias in favor of the image of the romantic author. Yet,
when we incorporate a greater understanding of the early history of English-language
dramatic writing, the predominant image of the solitary playwright laboring to
produce a work of genius proves to be not only ahistorical but unduly influential in
the assessment of joint authorship claims. The dominant author is simply the
romantic author in disguise.

347. In Canada, another country whose copyright law descended from English common law, courts
have reached conflicting conclusions on the heightened intent requirement for joint works. Although some
trial courts have followed Childress, see, e.g., Neudorf v. Nettwerk Prods., Ltd. (1999) 71 B.C.L.R. 3d
290 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), the Federal Court expressly rejected that approach in Neugebauer v. Labieniec,
2009 FC 666, 349 F.T.R. 53 (FC), where the court relied instead on Levy v. Rutley. Canada's Copyright
Act is similar to that of the United Kingdom, defining a joint work as "a work produced by the
collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of one author is not distinct from the

contribution of the other author or authors." Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, sec. 2.
348. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.

